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The Shrinking Back: The Law
of Biography
Mary Sarah Bilder*
I. INTRODUCTION
We should all be ready to say that if the secrets of our daily lives and inner
souls may instruct other surviving souls, let them be open to men hereafter,
even as they are to God now. . .. Not that I do not intimately understand
the shrinking back from the idea of publicity on any terms-not that I
would not myself destroy papers of mine which were sacred to me for per-
sonal reasons-but then I never would call this natural weakness, virtue-
nor would I, as a teacher of the public, announce it and attempt to justify it
as an example to other minds and acts, I hope.1
Elizabeth Barrett Browning would not be pleased with the law of biogra-
phy. The "law of biography" is not a phrase used in law schools, despite the
rise of so-called "law and ..." courses2 and the current recognition of a "law
and literature" school.3 A literary critic, William Epstein, used the phrase
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1. Elizabeth Barrett Browning, in ROBERT BROWNING, 1 LETTERS OF ROBERT BROWNING
AND ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING 481 (1898), quoted in RICHARD D. ALTICK, LIVES AND
LETTERS: A HISTORY OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 159 n.4 (1965).
Browning may not have overcome "this natural weakness." Altick speculates that she would "have
applauded" the efforts of her husband to restrict access to papers "in her own case."
2. See David Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1989, at B6, col. 1.
3. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELA-
TION (1988); James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature? (Book Review), 102
HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989).
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in warning his readers that his book on biography would "disrupt, deform,
and de-authorize the rule-governed relationships (the so-called generic con-
ventions) by and through which the 'law' of biography is and has been un-
derstood."4 The law of biography encompasses more than the customs,
practices, and habits of biographers; a legal "law of biography" also exists.
Molded by copyright law and enlivened by privacy law, this "legal" law
recently has come under intense scrutiny. Congressional bills,5 legislative
hearings,6 and extensive commentary have examined developments over the
past several years that appear to foreclose the opportunity to use the unpub-
lished expression written by biographical subjects without their or their es-
tates' express permission. In this article, I seek to describe the law, to
dishevel its assumptions, and to suggest that only by altering the legal doc-
trine can we understand our history and instruct ourselves, the surviving
souls.
But first, a very brief history ofbiography. The earliest biographies were
typically didactic stories of heroism told by authors (almost always men)
who knew their subjects.7 Biography served the purpose of conveying a
message to the audience about the good life. For several centuries, biogra-
phy sporadically reappeared in this form. 8
Then came the development ofmodem biography, a process biographical
theorists describe as possessing three epiphanal moments. First came Bos-
well's Life of Johnson.9 This biography broke the traditional rules about
writing biography: it contained more James Boswell than Samuel Johnson;
relied heavily upon Boswell's recollection of Johnson's voice; displayed ex-
tensive research; did not hesitate to portray Johnson in less than the most
flattering light; and was brillantly written. Boswell, despite criticism, be-
came the father of modem biography. to
4. WILLIAM H. EPSfEIN, RECOGNIZING BIOGRAPHY 3 (1987).
5. See H.R. 4263, IOIst Cong., 2d. Sess., 136 CONGo REc. H805-G6, H830 (1990); S. 2370,
IOIst Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONGo REc. S3532, S3549-50 (1990). The bills would have amended 17
U.S.C. § 107 to state that the fair use doctrine applies to published and unpublished works.
6. Fair Use and Unpublished Works: Hearings on H.R. 4263 and S. 2370 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Judiciary Comm. and the
Subcomm. on the Constitution ofthe Senate Judiciary Comm., IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings]. The official committee print of the hearings had not been published prior to the
publication of this article. References to Hearings are to the unofficial copies ofindividual submitted
statements (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
7. Biography, as United States audiences understand it, is a product of "Western" culture.
The earliest biographies appeared in Greece and Rome, by authors such as Plato and Plutarch,
followed by biographies exploring the lives of the saints (hagiography). See ROBERT GITTINGS, THE
NATURE OF BIOGRAPHY 18-21 (1978); PAUL MURRAY KENDALL, THE ART OF BIOGRAPHY 89-90
(1965).
8. Notable biographies after the Elizabethan Age included a few by women about their hus-
bands, for example those by Lucy Hutchinson and Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of NewcastIe. See
R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 29; P.M. KENDALL, supra note 7, at 96. Later came biographies
written by Roger North, Izaak Walton, John Aubrey, Thomas More, and Dr. Samuel Johnson. See
R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 23,26-29, 31. See generally R. MTlCK, supra note 1, at 3-45.
9. JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON (G.B. Hill & L.F. Powell rev. ed. 1964)
(1791).
10. See R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 31-33; see also R. ALTlCK, supra note 1, at 46-74; LEON
EDEL, WRITING LIVES: PRINCIPIA BIOGRAPHICA 42-58 (1984); RICHARD ELLMANN, GOLDEN
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The second moment came with Lytton Strachey's Eminent Victorians. II
Strachey's short, acerbic, undocumented, highly literate biography sought
primarily to criticize. He condemned traditional biographies, which merely
"commemorate the dead ... with their ill-digested masses of material, their
slipshod style, their tone of tedious panegyric, their lamentable lack of selec-
tion, of detachment, of design[.] They are as familiar as the cortege of the
undertaker and wear the same air of slow, funereal barbarism."12 Strachey
echoed Boswell's promotion of the biographer and set new standards for
biography: It could-in fact, should-be innovative, critical, and literary.13
Freud and pyschoanalysis appear to constitute a third moment.14
Although overt pyschobiography has not gained prominence, IS Freud's in-
fluence can be seen in the legitimation of the inquiry into the mind of the
subject often through the analysis of short quotations. 16 Modem biography
continues to evolve, with an increasing emphasis on the social, political, and
economic circumstances affecting the subject. I? And as any browser in a
bookstore will notice, biography addresses a diversity of subject matters and
historiographical approaches. IS
CoDGERS: BIOGRAPHICAL SPECULATIONS 2-4 (1973). For approximately the next 100 years, few
followed BoswelI's lead, owing to the rising Evangelical movement. As a consequence, biography
became, in essence, "the art of concealment." A few biographies were exceptions: Thomas Carlyle,
Mrs. Gaskell, James Anthony Froude. See R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 35-37. See generally
A.O.J. COCKSHUT, TRUTH TO LIFE: THE ART OF BIOGRAPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(1974) (describing biography in the late Victorian period).
I I. LYTTON STRACHEY, EMMINENT VICTORIANS (1918); see R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at
38-39,41-42; DAVID NOVARR, THE LINES OF LIFE: THEORIES OF BIOGRAPHY, 1880-1970, at 27-30
(1986).
12. R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 38.
13. See id. at 39. Leon Edel suggests that Strachey became too literary and crossed into "bio-
graphical fiction." See L. EDEL, supra note 10, at 79.
14. Freudian psychoanalysis predates Strachey, but its influence was felt most strongly begin-
ning in the 19205. See R. ALTICK, supra note 1, at 334-43; MILTON LoMASK, THE BIOGRAPHER'S
CRAFT 121-31 (1986).
15. See R. ELLMANN, supra note 10, at 256.
16. See R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 42-52; P.M. KENDALL, supra note 7, at 116, 121-22.
Ernest Jones's biography of Freud may be one of the most successful examples.
17. See R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 54-58 (discussing the influence of Marxism).
18. Biographers explore the tension between biographical fact and fiction. See generally VIR-
GINIA WOOLF, ORLANDO: A BIOGRAPHY (1928); Bruce Duffy, The Do-It-YourselfLife ofLudwig
Wittgenstein, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1988, § 7 (Book Review), at 1, 68-69 (discussing freedom of
novelistic biography); Caryn James, The Characters are Real, the History Isn't, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4,
1989, at C15, col. 1 (discussing novelistic biography). They write about relationships, see R. GIT-
TINGS, supra note 7, at 80-82 (discussing biographies of H.G. Wells and Rebecca West); JEFFREY
MEYERS, E.M. Forster and T.E. Lawrence: A Friendship, in THE SPIRIT OF BIOGRAPHY 91-99
(1989); JEFFERY MEYERS, Wyndham Lewis and T.s. Eliot: A Friendship, in THE SPIRIT OF BIOGRA-
PHY, supra, at 175-85; Gavan Daws, "I Reach Beyond the Laboratory-Brain'~'Men, Dolphins, and
Biography, in EssAYING BIOGRAPHY: A CELEBRATION FOR LEON EDEL 167-91 (G. Fromm ed.
1986); they write about groups, see R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 84; Margot Peters, Group Biogra-
phy: Challenges and Methods, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN BIOGRAPHY 41-51 (A. Friedson ed. 1982);
and they write about families, see, e.g., Leslie A. Marchand, Mary Came Along and Changed Every-
thing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 38, col. 1 (reviewing WILLIAM ST. CLAIR,
THE GODWINS AND THE SHELLEYS: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A FAMILY (1989». They produce hefty
"definitive" works overstuffed with primary sources, see R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 64-67 (criti-
cizing the "definitive" work); P.M. KENDALL, supra note 7, at 131-32; and shorter impressionistic
books, see id. at 131-32. They write for and about the famous and the unknown, see R. GITTINGS,
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In practicing the craft, biographers have faced formal legal restrictions
on their activities.19 Legal doctrines have placed powerful shields on the
forearms of many subjects (and their families) reluctant to have their lives
examined and exposed by biographers. Vladimir Nabokov wrote to his biog-
rapher: "I shall not hesitate to sue you for breach of contract, slander, libel,
and deliberate attempts to damage my personal reputation ...."20 Biogra-
phers have been sued for the unauthorized use of unpublished21 and pub-
lished material,22 defamation?3 invasion of privacy,24 transcription of
supra note 7, at 74-78 (praising HUGH TREVOR-ROPER, A HIDDEN LIFE: THE ENIGMA OF SIR
EDWARD BACKHOUSE (1976»; women, see Mary Beth Norton, The Pattern in "The Yellow Wall-
paper," N.Y. Times, July 15, 1990, § 7 (Book Review), at 10, col. 1 (reviewing ANN J. LANE, To
"HERLAND" AND BEYOND: THE LIFE AND WORK OF CHARLOTfE PERKINS GILMAN (1990»; men,
children, all races, see, e.g., Noel C. Manganyi, Biography: The Black South African Connection, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN BIOGRAPHY, supra, at 52; John Patrick Diggins, "I Walk in Dignity," N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 1, col. I (reviewing MARTIN BAUML DUBERMAN,
PAUL ROBESON: A BIOGRAPHY (1989»; social classes, see Frank E. Vandiver, Biography as an
Agent ofHumanism, in THE BIOGRAPHER'S GIFf: LIFE HISTORIES AND HUMANISM 3-20 (J. Ven-
inga ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE BIOGRAPHER'S GIFf]; and interests, see id. at 7 (noting the prolifera-
tion of biographies about scientists). .
19. At times, the legal restrictions may seem a minor hindrance when compared to human
stubbornness and deterrence. Biographers have been known to joke that the first rule in biography is
"kill the widow." For example, William Allen White gave this advice to historian Walter Johnson.
See JOHN A. GARRATY, THE NATURE OF BIOGRAPHY 171 (1957). White's advice came from expe-
rience. The widows of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Calvin Coolidge had asked friends and
acquaintances of both men not to cooperate with White on his work on the lives of Wilson and
Coolidge. Id. at 171 n.3.
Widows may have become the target of biographers because women, as a general rule, outlive
men, and thus are often the custodians of their late husbands' papers. Moreover, until recently, men,
not women, were the predominant subjects of biography, perhaps because of "masculinist (generally
heterosexual) cultural expectations." W. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 169. The "widow as obstacle"
stereotype persists. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105,
1118 (1990) (discussing the "widow censor"-heirs and executors who can regulate quotation or
close paraphrasing from personal papers of deceased public figures for fifty years after their death).
20. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 1, 37, col. 2 (quoting VLADIMIR
NABOKOV: SELECTED LETfERS, 1940-1977 (D. Nabokov & M. Bruccoli eds. 1989».
2L See, e.g., Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (copyright
infringement action against publishers of MARGARET WALKER, RICHARD WRIGHT, DAEMONIC
GENIUS (1988), by Ellen Wright, Richard Wright's widow); New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry
Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (copyright infringement action against publishers of
RUSSELL MILLER, BARE-FACED MESSIAH: THE TRUE STORY OF L. RON HUBBARD (1988), by
corporation holding copyright to Hubbard's papers), aff'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1989), reh'g denied en banc, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990);
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (copyright infringement action
against publisher of IAN HAMILTON, J.D. SALINGER: A WRITING LIFE (1988), initiated by Salin-
ger), rev'a, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
22. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 361 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 381 F. Supp. 29
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (infringement action against Louis Nizer, for
his book, The Implosion Conspiracy, initiated by sons of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for Nizer's use
of the Rosenbergs' published letters), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (infringement action by Howard Hughes against Random House for publishing a
biography of Hughes that used articles from a magazine owned by Hughes), rev'd, 366 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Estate of Hemingway V. Random House, Inc., 53
Misc. 2d 462,279 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct.) (common law copyright infringement action against pub-
lisher of A.E. Hotchner's Hemingway biography for use of published and unpublished materials),
aff'd. 29 A.D.2d 633, 285 N.Y.S.2d 568 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250,
296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968); Folsom V. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (copy-
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conversations,25 and breach of contract.26 They, in turn, have sued other
authors for use of their material in later books.z7 Biographers have been
embroiled in disputes involving the attorney-client privilege28 and the right
of access to document collections.29 Even biographical films have provoked
right infringement action against "biographer" of George Washington by holders of copyright to
Washington's letters).
23. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Random House, 703 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (publishers of
history of Elvis Presley's secret married life, Are You Lonesome Tonight?: The Untold Story ofElvis
Presley's One True Love and the Child He Never Knew, sued by a woman whom the author claimed
had been forced to marry her own middle-aged brother when she was eleven), aff'd. 865 F.2d 664
(5th Cir. 1989); cf. Ross v. Esquire, 94 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1938) (Frank Harris's attorney sued a
ghostwriter who, in an article appearing in Esquire magazine, claimed he had ghostwritten Harris's
biography of George Bernard Shaw; libel involved ghostwriter's accusation that attorney had
cheated him out offee); Washington Post, June 20, 1989, at Cl, col. 1 (discussing successful attempt
by sons of Italian admiral to compel David Brinkley, by threat of legal action, to change his depic-
tion of their father in WASHINGTON GOES TO WAR (1988».
24. See, e.g., Fasching v. Kallinger, 211 N.J. Super. 26, 510 A.2d 694 (App. Div. 1986) (state
law privacy action against biographer of a murderer by parents and sister of the subject's victim);
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1,294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(state privacy action against Random House by Howard Hughes), aff'd. 32 A.D.2d 892, 301
N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (state privacy action by subject of Milton J. Shapiro's The Warren Spahn Story
against publishers), aff'd, 23 A.D.2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324,
221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239, reargued, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233
N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969); Koussevitzky v. Al-
Ien, Towne & Heath, 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S. 2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (state privacy action against
unauthorized biography of conductor Serge Koussevitzky).
25. See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 462,279 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 29 A.D.2d 633, 285 N.Y.S.2d 568 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d
250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Cameron Harvey & Linda Vincent, MacKenzie and LeSueur: Historians'Rights,
10 MANITOBA L.J. 281, 285-87 (1980).
27. See. e.g., Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (infringement action against
author of biography of Igor Stravinsky by author and copyright holder of numerous books written
with and about Stravinsky); Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950) (author
of biography of Hans Christian Andersen based on Danish documents sued author of a novelized
story of Andersen's life).
28. See David A. Kaplan, A Matter of Truth or Confidences: Does Attorney-Client Privilege
Outweigh Demands ofHistory?, NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1988, at 36 (examining debate concerning his-
torians' access to legal documents in which the legal issues discussed have long been moot).
29. See. e.g.. American Library Ass'n v. Faurer, 631 F. Supp. 416 (D.C.D.C.) (researcher sued
director of National Security Agency for making previously available documents nonaccessible for
reasons of national security), aff'd sub nom. American Library Ass'n v. Odom, 818 F.2d 81 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); cf. Wilkinson v. FBI, III F.R.D. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (motion by civil rights groups for
a protective order to bar the FBI's access to papers that had been conditionally restricted by the
State Historical Society of Wisconsin).
In Wilkinson. the FBI sought access to the papers of Anne Braden, a member of the National
Committee Against Repressive Legislation. Braden's attorneys argued that "the First Amendment
provides a privilege against disclosure of information through the discovery process." Notice of
Motion and Motion for Protective Order, Memorandum of Points and Authorities 7, Wilkinson (No.
CV 80-1048 AWT (TX). In addition, an amicus curiae brief on behalf of archivists. historians, and
academics argued that privileges were not waived by allowing restricted access to papers placed in
archives. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective
Order 10-14. The district court held that a privilege existed with respect to associational activities,
but that Braden had not demonstrated that it should apply in this case. See Wilkinson, III F.R.D.
at 436. The court also refused to create a broad archival privilege. ld. at 437-38. For an account of
the case. see Harold L. Miller, Will Access Restrictions Hold Up in Court? The FBI's Attempt to Use
the Braden Papers At the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 52 AM. ARCHIVIST 180. 181-84
(1989).
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lawsuits.30 At times, courts have quoted biographers as special masters.3!
This article does not address all restrictions on biographers, only those in-
volving the use of unpublished materials, including letters, diaries, annota-
tions in books, and scribbled notes.
In 1987, New Era Publications, which held the copyright in the writings
ofL. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, sued to enjoin the
publication of a posthumous biography of Hubbard, written by Russell
Miller, entitled Bare-Faced Messiah: The True Story ofL. Ron Hubbard.32
The case typifies the problem of the use of unpublished expression and has
become the center of recent controversy.33 It involved Miller's extensive
quotation of Hubbard's unpublished letters and diaries.34 Miller's publisher,
the named defendant, argued that the quotations were designed to demon-
strate "through Hubbard's words ... his flaws of character."35 The district
court judge, Pierre N. Leval, found the majority of the quotations protected
by the copyright statute's fair use provision.36 Judge Leval interpreted pre-
30. See, e.g., Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (infringement action by copyright holder of Charlie Chaplin movies against broadcasting net-
work over film biography of Chaplin that used filmclips from his movies), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d
Cir.), eert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad-
casting Cos., 463 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y 1978) (creator of biographical film about a student wrestler
sued broadcasting companies for unauthorized use of film clips on national television), aff'd, 621
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192,249 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (supporting
an argument about the importance of Justice John McLean's dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) by citing his biographer); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Boston Harbor
Marina, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 36,40 (D. Mass. 1968) (citing 1 WILLIAM W. STORY, THE LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY (1851) to support argument about importance of an opinion by Justice
Story); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 437 n.6 (2d Cir. 1960) (noting, in affirming
decision to enjoin the Postmaster General's order refusing to allow the mailing of D.H Lawrence's
Lady Chatterly's Lover, that Harry T. Moore, Lawrence's biographer, called the book "our time's
most significant romance"); United States ex reI. Kling v. La Vallee, 188 F. Supp. 470, 473
(N.D.N.Y. 1960) (stating that an infamous bank robber's disavowal of the petitioner's guilt lacked
credibility because the bank robber had told his biographer that he had not participated in robbery).
32. New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
aff'd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied en bane, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989),
eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990). The New Era opinions and Judge Leval's unpublished appendix
(over 70 pages of comparisons and tables) appear together in 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 49-214 (1989).
33. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text. A related case, New Era Publications, Int'l v.
Carol Publishing Group, 792 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 904 F.2d 152 (2d
Cir. 1990), reassured followers of the controversy that only the use of unpublished materials were at
issue. The case involved the quotation of Hubbard's published material in JONATHAN CAVEN-
ATACK, A PIECE OF BLUE SKY: SCIENTOLOGY, DIANETICS AND L. RON HUBBARD EXPOSED
(1985). The Second Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Wilfred Feinberg, overturned the district
court's permanent injunction barring publication. The panel found that even epigraphs of Hubbard
quotes constituted fair use. See also Publisher Victorious on Hubbard Biography, N.Y. Times, May
27, 1990, at A24, col. 5; Debra Squires, Quotes Upheld Under "Fair Use," N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1990, at
I, col. 1.
34. New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1498. The Church of Scientology may have been motivated to
sue because it disliked Miller's critical portrayal of Hubbard. See id. at 1499 n.2. The plaintiff
offered 43 pages of tables listing uses of unpublished materials. ld. at 1498. The district court noted
probable overcounting. ld. at 1521. The dispute did not focus on quotations from published materi-
als. See id. at 1498, 1523.
35. ld. at 1498. The book aimed to show that "Hubbard was dishonest, pretentious, boastful,
paranoid, cowardly, cruel, disloyal, aggressive, bizarre and finally even insane ...." ld.
36. ld. at 1520, 1524. The 1976 Copyright Act states:
HeinOnline -- 43 Stan. L. Rev. 305 1990-1991
January 1991] THE LAW OF BIOGRAPHY 305
vious cases to permit fair use when the "point cannot be effectively made by
merely reciting the facts."37 No fair use, however, would be permitted
merely "to make the biography more vivid."38 Judge Leval did not consider
Hubbard's privacy interests, stating that copyright law did not address pri-
vacy issues; however, in a somewhat contradictory statement, he added that
fair use analysis could include privacy interests in certain circumstances.39
Citing free speech interests, Judge Leval refused to grant an injunction.40
A majority (Judges Roger J. Miner and Frank X. Altimari) of a panel of
the Second Circuit disagreed with Judge Leval's analysis, but not his result.
The court stated that "unpublished works normally enjoy complete protec-
tion."41 Although "complete protection" would have resulted in an injunc-
tion against the book's publication, the court denied the injunction under the
theory oflaches.42 Chief Judge James L. Oakes concurred but advocated an
analysis closer to that offered by Judge Leva1.43
..• the fair use ofa copyrighted work ... is not an infringement ofcopyright. In determin-
ing whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use ... ;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Judge Leval found that "there is a body of material of small, but more than
negligible size, which, given the strong presumption against fair use of unpublished material, cannot
be held to pass the fair use test." New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1524. Most of the uses, however, were
found to be acceptable.
37. New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1502-03. Hence, Miller was permitted to demonstrate the follow-
ing: "The Church's False Mythology of the Founder," id. at 1508; "Hubbard Dishonesty," id. at
1509; "Boastfulness, Pomposity, Grandiosity, Pretension, Self-Importance," id. at 1511; "Paranoia,"
id. at 1512; "Snobbery, Bigotry, Disdain for Asians," id.; "Cruelty, Disloyalty," id. at 1513; "Ag-
gressiveness, Vicious and Scheming Tactics," id.; "Cynicism," id. at 1514; "Derangement, Insanity,
Bizarre Psuedo-Science," id. at 1515; "Self-Presentation in Early Diaries," id. at 1517; "Accurate
Rendition of Idea," id. at 1518; and "Early Writing Style." ld.
38. ld. at 1503; see also id. at 1523.
39. "If the protected document is highly personal, private and intimate, if the author has a
strong personal interest in deferring publication, if the public interest in the contents is minimal and
voyeuristic at best ... those might well be factors disfavoring a finding of fair use." ld. at 1505.
40. ld. at 1527 ("When the interests protected by the copyright are in acute conflict with those
represented by the First Amendment ... an award of damages .•. can protect the copyright holder
with far less injury to .•. freedom of speech than an injunction.").
41. New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989). The
court did not go so far as to hold no fair use for unpublished works, noting only a "strong presump-
tion" against fair use. ld. Although Judge Leval had also noted a "strong presumption," New Era.
695 F. Supp. at 1524, the Second Circuit found that the presumption led to three of the four fair use
factors-the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and
the effect of the use on the market-weighing in favor of New Era. New Era. 873 F.2d at 583.
42. New Era. 873 F.2d at 584-85. New Era had waited until two years after learning that
Miller's book would be published before it had brought an action. Such conduct, the court held,
constituted "unreasonable and inexcusable delay." ld. at 584. Although deciding the case on an
equitable technicality, the court rejected Holt's free speech claims: "the fair use doctrine encom-
passes all claims of first amendment in the copyright field ...." ld.; cf note 40 supra and accompa-
nying text. It also noted that, but for laches, an injunction would have issued because the public
would have been deprived only of an "infringing" historical study. New Era. 873 F.2d at 584.
43. Judge Oakes agreed with Judge Leval that "words that are facts calling for comment are
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The Second Circuit's decision in New Era narrowed the already re-
stricted ability of biographers to use unpublished documents established by
the Supreme Court's decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises44 and the Second Circuit's earlier decision in Salinger v. Random
House, Inc. 45 Although factual backgrounds appear to make these two deci-
sions inapposite to typical posthumous biographies,46 their underlying legal
analyses, when combined with New Era, confront biographers with the prob-
lem, as one writer put it, of writing "history in a straitjacket."47
In the months following the New Era decision, the case and its Harper &
distinguishable from words that simply enliven text. The law recognizes that words themselves may
be facts to be proved." New Era. 873 F.2d at 592. Although finding the court bound to observe a
narrower scope for fair use of unpublished documents, he emphasized that an absolute ban did not
exist. ld. at 593. Judge Oakes stated that "[r]esponsible biographers and historians constantly use
primary sources, letters, diaries and memoranda. Indeed, it would be irresponsible to ignore such
sources of information." ld. at 596. He would have upheld the denial ofan injunction on traditional
equitable grounds. ld. at 596-98.
44. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court held that quotation by The
Nation of portions of President Gerald Ford's unpublished manuscript of his memoirs-which were
about to be excerpted in Time magazine and Reader's Digest before their complete publication by
Harper & Row-did not constitute fair use and thus infringed on Harper & Row's copyright. See id.
at 569. The Court stated that the "unpublished nature of a work is '[a] key, though not necessarily
determinative factor' tending to negate a defense of fair use." ld. at 554 (quoting S. REp. No. 473,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975». The Court noted that the copyright statute encompassed first
amendment interests. See id. at 559-60. The magazine paid damages. For detailed discussion, see
Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew ofFair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv.
233,270-77 (1988); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REv.
1659, 1664-95 (1988).
45. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 818 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987). In Salinger, the Second Circuit (Judges Jon O. Newman and Roger J. Miner) reversed the
district court (Judge Pierre N. Leval) and held that Ian Hamilton's biography, J.D. Salinger: A
Writing Life, infringed J.D. Salinger's copyright in letters by him and held in library collections. 811
F.2d at 92. The court found that unpublished "works normally enjoy complete protection against
copying any protected expression." ld. at 97. It noted, but rejected, an alternative interpretation of
fair use that would have permitted the use of less significant amounts of unpublished as opposed to
published material. ld.
For criticism of the Second Circuit's decision, see Vincent H. Peppe, Fair Use of Unpublished
Materials in the Second Circuit: The Letters ofthe Law-Salinger v. Random House, 54 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 417 (1988) (student author); David J. Cowan, Salinger v. Random House: Is Copyright
Protection ofLetters Meant to Serve the Public or Their Author?, 10 HASfINGS COMM/ENT LJ. 941
(1988) (student author). But see Roger L. Zissu, Salinger and Random House Part II: Fears, Criti-
cisms ofOpinion Resultfrom Misreading ofDecision, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 189 (1988).
Hamilton rewrote his book, excising the quotations and including a narrative of his legal tribu-
lations. As one blurb on the back cover of the book noted, the biography is "probably a lot more
entertaining than either of the versions he had written before Salinger and his attorneys intervened."
IAN HAMILTON, IN SEARCH OF J.D. SALINGER (1988) (quoting John Blades, Salinger Biographer
Finally Gets His Man, Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1988 at 3, col. 4).
46. Salinger may be distinguishable because Salinger had made public his desire for privacy,
see New Era, 873 F.2d at 585 (Oakes, J., concurring); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92; Wright v. Warner
Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("what motivated the Court of Appeals in
Salinger, at least in part, was concern over J.D. Salinger's right to privacy"); I. HAMILTON, supra
note 45, at 4, 7-9. Harper & Row may be distinguishable because The Nation scooped the authorized
publication of the memoirs in Time magazine and Reader's Digest. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
543; note 44 supra.
47. David Kaplan, The End of History? A Copyright Controversy Leads to Self-Censorship,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 1989, at 80, col. 3. New Era created the fear that the use ofany unpublished
expression would fail the Second Circuit's gloss on the four factor fair use test. See Hearings, supra
note 6 (statement of Floyd Abrams).
HeinOnline -- 43 Stan. L. Rev. 307 1990-1991
January 1991] THE LAW OF BIOGRAPHY 307
Row-Salinger parentage became an oft-examined trinity in the press. Arti-
cles, mostly critical, chanted the litany of the four fair use factors, disputed
the opinions, and teased readers with hints of scandals buried by legal tech-
nicalities.48 Controversy also continued on the judicial front. The Second
Circuit's denial of a petition to rehear the New Era case49 was accompanied
by a "highly unusual and unusually acerbic"50 dissent by Judge Jon O. New-
man. Judge Newman-who had written in Salinger that unpublished ex-
pression "normally enjoy[s] complete protection"5I-criticized the panel
majority for not "confin[ing] its opinion to that unexceptional conclusion"
that laches barred a preliminary injunction.52 Nevertheless, the dissent dis-
cussed the broader issues covered in the panel opinion with the hope of "al-
lay[ing] ... misunderstanding."53 The majority opinion, while denying
rehearing, sought to reassure biographers and journalists that New Era did
not curtail "their right to report facts contained in unpublished writings,
even ifsome brief quotation of expressive content is necessary to report those
facts accurately."54 Despite the judicial efforts, confusion reigned. The
claims of Judge Miner and Judge Newman that their respective opinion and
dissent reflected the uncontroversial view of the Circuit, the differences be-
tween the two New Era opinions, and the confusing position of Judge New-
man, author of the Salinger opinion and the dissent from the denial to rehear
New Era, did little to alleviate discomfort.55
And if predicting the Second Circuit's position were not difficult enough,
the principal judges "[u]npredictably ... avail[ed] themselves of the oppor-
48. See, e.g., Leon Friedman, Copyright Wrongs, NATION, Mar. 19, 1990, at 368; R.Z. Shep-
pard, Foul Weather for Fair Use, TIME, Apr. 30, 1990, at 86; J. Anthony Lukas, A Ruling that
Hobbles Historians, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1990, at A27, col. 2; Ralph Oman, Protecting Franny &
Zooey, L.A. Times, July 13, 1990, at B7, col. 1; Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, "Fair Use"
Under Federal Copyright Law. N.Y.L.J., June 27, 1990, at 3, col. 1; David Goldberg & Robert J.
Bernstein, "New Era" Revisited, N.Y.L.J., June 27, 1990, at 3, col. 2; Amy Gamberman, Unfair Use:
Copyright Decision Cramps Writers'Style, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1990, at A20; Bob Sipchen, Who is
the Owner ofthe Written Word?, L.A. Times, Mar. 12, 1990, at El, col. 2; Peter Edelman, Copyright
Case Not Onefor History Books. Legal Times, Mar. 5, 1990, at 22, col. 1; M.R. Montgomery, High
Court Stays Out ofCopyright Fight, Boston Globe, Feb. 21, 1990, at 41, col. 1; Kaplan, supra note 47.
49. New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659 (1989). Judge Miner wrote
again for the court.
50. Flumenbaum & Karp, supra note 48, at 6, col. 3.
51. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987).
52. New Era, 884 F.2d at 662 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial ofrehearing en bane). Chief
Judge Oakes, who had concurred with the result in the critical New Era opinion, 873 F.2d at 585·98,
joined Judge Newman along with two other judges in dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
bane.
53. New Era. 884 F.2d at 662.
54. ld. at 663.
55. Judge Walker's decision in Wright betrays this judicial discomfort. Judge Walker found
no copyright infringement for the use of Richard Wright's unpublished papers. The opinion strug-
gles to make the second fair use factor favor the defendant. Judge Walker wrote, "the works' status
as published or unpublished is just one-albeit a 'critical,' Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-aspect."
748 F. Supp. 105, 110 (S.D.N.Y 1990). Having wiggled out of the Harper & Row stranglehold (in a
move Houdini would have admired), Judge Walker concluded that the defendant's paraphrasing had
significance. Then to escape Salinger, Judge Walker found that in Wright. the paraphrasing involved
"factual" rather than personal paraphrasing. Whether the Second Circuit (assuming the case is
appealed) will approve of Judge Walker's analysis should be interesting.
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tunity to give lectures and publish articles about the issues raised ...."56
Although these articles57 reiterated the general positions stated by the judges
in their published opinions, the expansive discussion of the issues, the at-
tacks and defenses of prior opinions, and the rhetorical flair of the authors
created an intriguing, albeit occasionally exasperating, question of
jurisprudence.
The use of unpublished materials in biographies and other writings had
generated substantial academic58 and general59 commentary even prior to
New Era. But the New Era decision and its coverage in the popular press
rekindled feelings smoldering since Salinger.
Not surprisingly, Congress entered the fray. In March 1990, after the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in New Era, Representative Robert W.
Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) and Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.) introduced H.R.
4263 and S. 3549.60 These bills sought to "clarify that ... [the fair use
section of the copyright law] applies to both published and unpublished
works."61 The July hearings on the bills raised concerns over whether legis-
lative action was advisable prior to further judicial action, and whether the
proposed amendment would accomplish its intended purpose.62 In August
and September, alternative language proposed that fair use for unpublished
materials be limited to "history, biography, fiction, news and general interest
reporting, or social, political or moral commentary."63 But in early Octo-
56. Hearings, supra note 6, at 47-48 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights and
Assistant Librarian for Copyright Services); see also New Era Publications v. Carol Publishing
Group, 904 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1990) (including comments on the articles by the Second Circuit
judges).
57. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 19; Roger J. Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul
Play?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 1 (1989); Jon O. Newman, Not the End ofHistory: The Second Circuit
Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 12 (1989); James L. Oakes, Copyrights and
Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, - HOFSTRA L. REv. - (forthcoming).
58. See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Historians and the Continuing Controversy over Fair Use of
Unpublished Manuscript Materials, 91 AM. HIST. REv. 859 (1986); Robert C. Hauhart, Copyrighting
Personal Letters, Diaries, and Memorabilia: A Review and A Suggestion, 13 U. BALT. L. REv. 244
(1984); John M. Kemochan, Protection of Unpublished Works in the United States Before and After
the Nation Case, 33 J. CoPYRIGHT SOC'Y 322 (1986); William Strauss, Protection of Unpublished
Works (1957), in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 189 (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963); Jane Tucker
Dana, Copyright and Privacy Protection of Unpublished Works-The Author's Dilemma, 13 CoLUM.
J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 351 (1977) (student author); Peppe, supra note 45; John L. Wilson, The Scholar
and the Copyright Law, 10 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 104, 113-21 (1959) (student author).
59. See, e.g., James Atlas, Speaking III ofthe Dead, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, § 6 (Magazine),
at 40, col. 1 (examining ethics of "pathographies"-biographies that focus on the failures and amie-
ties of their subjects); Caryn James, The Fate ofJoyce Family Letters Causes Angry Literary Debate,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1988, at C11, col. 1 (discussing James Joyce's grandson's destmction ofletters
from Joyce's daughter).
60. See note 5 supra.
61. The bills proposed adding to the existing law the words "whether published or unpub-
lished." H.R. 4263, supra note 5, 136 CONGo REc. H805-07, H830; S. 2370, supra note 5, at 136
CONGo REc. S3549-50.
62. Statements were submitted by Judges Oakes, Miner, and Leval; copyright lawyers
Jonathan Lubell, Ralph Oman, William F. Patry, and Barbara Ringer; first amendment litigator
Floyd Abrams; and two authors, Taylor Branch and J. Anthony Lukas. See Hearings, supra note 6;
see also Washington Insider (BNA), July 12, 1990 (summarizing the hearing testimony).
63. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1990, at 1, 11, col. 1.
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ber, Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) "abruptly prevented the bill from
being placed on the agenda for a vote."64 Whether the bills will be reintro-
duced after the congressional adjournment is unknown.
The brouhaha surrounding the judicial decisions and the congressional
hearings might have seemed disproportionate to the apparent number of
people affected by the legal doctrine involving use of unpublished materials:
a few biographers inconvenienced by rewriting several sentences in forth-
coming books. This perception, however, would be misguided, for the con-
cerns underlying the legal issues implicate our understanding of history and
privacy. On one side stand those who forsee the death of biography and
history. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., wrote that the New Era decision
"strikes a blow against the whole historical enterprise."65 On the other side,
families, heirs, and even the subjects themselves plead for privacy and their
right not to have unpublished writings revealed to a curious public. Bernard
Malumud's daughter, Janna Malamud Smith, in discussing her struggle over
whether to burn or save her father's papers, wrote that "[g]ossipy biogra-
phies ... can extract a high and often hidden price in exchange for satisfying
our curiosity.... When a biographer reveals ... details to a massive audi-
ence, one's life is witnessed, but without the love, loyalty or privacy that
makes revelation meaningful."66 Although disagreement on the issue exists,
it is not as vehement as it first appears. Most observers eschew extreme
positions, believing in neither an absolute right to use unpublished materials
nor a ban on all material that heirs or executors would prefer not to see in
print.67
64. Id. at 11, col. 2. Pressure from computer software companies may have contributed to the
bills' scuttling. Id.
65. Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1989, at § 1, 16, col. 3. Schlesinger also observed that" '[i]f the law
were this way when I wrote the three volumes of "The Age of Roosevelt" •.• I might be two
volumes short.''' Kaplan, supra note 47, at 80.
66. Janna Malamud Smith, Where Does a Writer's Family Draw the Line?, N.Y. Times, Nov.
5, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 1, 43, col. 2, 44, col. 4. Other families have faced this dilemma.
Stephen Joyce, James Joyce's grandson, destroyed letters from James Joyce's aunt to his grandfather.
Joyce scholars and readers criticized his action. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1989, § 7 (Book Review),
at 2, col. 1 ("[I] firmly believe that there is a part of every man or woman's life, no matter how
famous he or she may be, that should remain private."); N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1988, at ell, col. 1;
cf. Carolyn Kizer, Passion Was the One Great Presence, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, § 7 (Book Re-
view), at 14, 18, col. 1 (terming PAUL MARIANI, DREAM SONG: THE LIFE OF JOHN BERRYMAN
(1990) a "binge-by-binge biography").
Some families no doubt consider the "high price" to refer as much to lost royalties as to re-
vealing publications. In this article, I do not address economic motivations for the legal doctrines
restricting the use of unpublished materials. I do not mean by this omission to imply that economic
considerations are irrelevant, for they are not. Cf. Fisher, supra note 44, at 1698-1744 (employing an
economic analysis to examine fair use doctrine); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into The Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency. Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1343, 1438 (1989) (analyzing encouragement theorists, persons who believe copyright "is justified
only to the extent that it encourages authors to generate new works"). But economic concerns
neither trump nor delegitimate other concerns, and for a noneconomist, the costs of embarking on
such an endeavor far outweigh any benefit to the reader. Hence, my article focuses on the legal
acceptance of broad ideas about privacy and history and the noneconomic consequences for biogra-
phers, subjects, and society.
67. See, e.g., New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1505 (discussing possible fair use consideration of pri-
vacy interests); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100 (noting "special circumstances as might fall within the
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Nevertheless, the legal law of biography appears to make onerous, and
may even foreclose,68 the use of unpublished expression without consent of
the copyright holder.69 The practical effect of this limitation on biographers
remains substantially unknown. Biographies often take years to research
and write;70 and authors, believing that either a fair use privilege exists or
the family will acquiesce, may not consult a lawyer until they attempt to
publish. Early indications suggest that biographers and publishers, fearing
damages and injunctions, are refusing to pursue biographies that involve un-
published materials.71
In this article, I explore the relation between the legal law of biography
and the literary theory of biography, and concern myself not so much with
precise contours as with the biography envisioned and permitted by these
doctrines. These issues are relevant to other literary enterprises, such as
nonbiographical historical scholarship, political criticism, fiction, and jour-
nalism.72 I focus, however, only on the use of unpublished materials in writ-
'narrower' scope of fair use available for unpublished works"); Benedict, supra note 58, at 381 (not-
ing the need to promote the interests of both scholars and heirs); Smith, supra note 66, at 43, col. 2
(Janna Malamud Smith asking, "What do we, his family, want people to know while we are still
alive? And to what information do biographers have legitimate entitlement?"); Interview with John
Milton Cooper, Professor and Chairman, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Department of History, in Madison, Wis. (Aug. 11, 1989); Interview with Andrew L. Kaufman,
Professor, Harvard Law School, in Cambridge, Mass. (Dec. 20, 1989); Interview with Linda Simon,
Director, Harvard Writing Center, in Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 6, 1989).
68. See Hearings, supra note 6 (statement of Floyd Abrams) (noting that if the defendant loses
on the second fair use factor-nature of the copyrighted material-he or she will, in effect, lose the
entire four factor test).
69. One writer dramatically stated that "[t]he [New Era] court held that quoting almost any-
thing unpublished, regardless of commercial value, presumptively violated a copyright. In such
cases, judges must automatically issue an injunction and block publication." Kaplan, supra note 47,
at 80 (emphasis in original). Whether permissible uses of unpublished documents remain is unclear.
Presumably, uses such as defense of reputation or proof of innocence would be accepted. See note
146 infra.
70. The biography of Langston Hughes took Arnold Rampersad ten years to write. Talk by
Arnold Rampersad, Harvard Law School (Apr. 7, 1990). The biography of Lyndon B. Johnson has
taken Robert Caro over twelve years, and that of Edna St. Vincent Millay has taken Nancy Milford
fourteen years. See Atlas, supra note 59, at 40, col. 1; Chron. Higher Educ. Nov. IS, 1989, at A4,
A6, col. 2 (noting the "snail's pace of most scholarly projects").
71. See, e.g., Chron. Higher Educ., supra note 70, at A6, cols. 1 & 2 (discussing the cancella-
tion of works on James Agee and Simone de Beauvoir after Salinger); Kaplan, supra note 47 (stating
that James Reston, Jr., deleted sections of his biography on John Connally that quoted from Con-
nally's letters, and that, in Ed Koch's collection of his mayoral letters, Koch chose not to include
quotes from the letters prompting his responses); N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1990, at I, col. 2 (quoting
Harriet Dorsen, general counsel of Bantam Doubleday Dell: "There is hardly a non-fiction book
that comes across my desk that does not have some problem with unpublished materials in it. You
take a risk if you quote from any unpublished documents without permission."); cf. Gamberman,
supra note 48 (recording the problems faced by biographers of Malcolm X and Richard Wright).
But see Chron. Higher Educ., supra note 70, at A6, cols. 1-2 (noting that "the number of specific
problems that have surfaced is relatively small").
72. Similar problems arise in fictionalized accounts of history in movies, see, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Dec. IS, 1989, at Cl8, col. 1 (director of Glory read 2000 letters written by Civil War colonel de-
picted in the film); N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1989, § 2, at I, col. 1 (asking "Can Movies Teach His-
tory?"); in autobiography, see, e.g., Miranda Seymour, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, § 7 (Book
Review), at 30, col. 2 (reviewer of HERBERT LEIBOWITZ, FABRICATING LIVES: EXPLORATIONS IN
AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1989), raising the issue of historical objectivity in expression:
"[A]utobiography is an honorable name for the dishonorable art of reinventing the past."); Henry
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ten biographies. Some writers have suggested that future biographers will
not face this problem because people in the late twentieth century write
fewer personal letters, preferring the telephone or computer mail.73 But the
ease of computer printouts and fax machines and the permanence of com-
puter storage indicate that similar concerns will remain, perhaps with
greater urgency.74
In Part II, I examine the legal constraints on biography: the fact/expres-
sion dichotomy and fair use doctrine of copyright law, and privacy theories
that inform copyright decisions. With respect to each area, I first offer an
overview of the legal doctrine. Second, I argue that each area of the law
rests on certain implicit assumptions about society; and third, I question the
validity of these assumptions.75 Fourth, I describe how the pervasiveness of
these assumptions in the law governs how biographers research, write, and
envision biography. In Section III, I suggest a normative vision of biogra-
phy that should be protected and encouraged by law and society. I argue
that because this "normative" biography avoids an acceptance of the societal
assumptions underlying current legal doctrines and encourages reader and
biographer to participate in a critical approach to interpretation, it can con-
tribute to greater social understanding, thereby offering the possibility of
change in law and community life.76 Current legal doctrines, however, fore-
close the possibility of normative biography. In Section IV, I critique the
preliminary fair use solutions suggested by legal commentary and congres-
sional action and sketch a different analysis, not involving fair use, that
might foster normative biography and nurture a culture of questioning.
Hampton, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 3, cols. 1 & 3 (reviewer of RALPH
DAVID ABERNATHY, AND THE WALlS CAME TUMBLING DOWN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1989),
criticizing Abernathy for commenting on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s sexual activities); oral his-
tory, see JOHN N. NEUENSCHWANDER, ORAL HISTORY AND THE LAW (1985); and access to other
historical documents, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1989, at Cl, C8, cols. 2-6 (discussing accusation
that restricted access to the Dead Sea Scrolls is blocking new historical interpretation); N.Y. Times,
Feb. 9, 1990, at A18, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at AI, col. 6 (discussing district court
holding that National Security Adviser John Poindexter was entitled to former President Ronald
Reagan's personal papers and diaries because they were material to his defense).
73. See James T. Kloppenberg, Objectivity and Historicism: A Century ofAmerican Historical
Writing (Book Review), 94 AM. HIST. REv. 1011, 1014 (1989).
74. See, e.g., UMBERTO Eco, FOUCAULT'S PENDULUM 56-57 (1989) (describing the search of
a dead man's computer diary). The analysis should apply to writing stored on computers, for "the
moment you pick up the clay, electronic or otherwise, you become a demiurge ...." Id. at 57; see
also N.Y. Times, July 7, 1990, at AI, col. I (discussing the "paperless office").
In addition, libraries are beginning to collect computer disks. Interview with Harry Martin,
Professor and Librarian, Langdell Library, Harvard Law School, in Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 9,
1990).
75. Cf Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 48
(1988) (discussing "the adoption of unstated reference points that hide from view a preferred posi-
tion and shield it from challenge by other plausible alternatives").
76. Cf Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 101-02 (1984) ("It
will •.. help us to relativize our understanding of the past's relation to the present if we see that our
conventional views of that relation are mediated by familiar story-lines ... [and that] there always
exist-and so we always may draw upon-eompeting stories that impress the same historical experi-
ence with radically different meanings.").
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II. THE LAW OF BIOGRAPHY
The principal legal constraints on biography involve copyright and pri-
vacy. Although the copyright statute does not explicitly mention privacy,
privacy concerns often inform copyright decisions. Some judicial opinions
and commentators suggest that the doctrines may be inseparable.77 For ana-
lytical ease, I discuss copyright and privacy separately; however, for the
foregoing reasons, strict adherence to this division is impossible.
A. Copyright
Cases involving biographers' use of unpublished materials raise specific
copyright issues. Under the 1976 federal copyright act,78 a court must first
determine whether someone, usually the plaintiff, owns a copyright in the
unpublished materials or whether the materials are in the public domain.79
"Facts," perceived as generally accepted or arguably verifiable information,
cannot be copyrighted; in contrast, expression, understood as a particular
individual's choice of words, can be copyrighted.80 If the material is subject
to copyright, the court must then decide whether the biographer has a fair
use defense, permitting use of the otherwise protected material.81 Under re-
cent cases, unpublished expression receives broad protection: it is subject at
77. See Jon O. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection ofPrivacy. 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 459, 477 (1988) ("Copyright law seeks to promote the useful arts. This task requires some
zone of privacy in which each of us may not only formulate our thoughts but also commit them to
paper."); Dana, supra note 58, at 351 (discussing "the ill-defined interface" of the two areas). Com-
mentators have suggested that the Second Circuit's Salinger decision promotes privacy concerns
within the rubric of copyright doctrine. See Peppe, supra note 45.
78. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988». The 1976 Act replaced the 1909 Act. Act ofMarch 4, 1909, Pub. L. No.
349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). Under the 1909 statute, only published materials received statu-
tory copyright protection. Unpublished materials were protected by common law copyright, which
granted perpetual protection. See HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY
PROPERTY 47-48,57,470-74 (1944). The 1976 statute abolished this dual system, granting federal
copyright protection at the moment the work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, regardless
of publication. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1988).
I will not discuss the effect of adherence by the United States to the Berne Convention, see
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (amend-
ing title 17 to bring United States copyright law into adherence with internationally recognized
standards for the protection of works of authorship of all kinds), on the issue of the use of unpub-
lished expression. Statements offered at the congressional hearings persuasively argue that the Con-
vention's language can be interpreted to permit a variety of uses of material short of complete
freedom to copy. See Hearings. supra note 6, at 18-28 (statement of Floyd Abrams); id. at 51-60
(statement of Ralph Oman).
79. Despite discarding the perpetual protection given unpublished materials under common
law copyright, the 1976 statute prohibits any materials from falling into the public domain before
December 31,2002. 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1988). Hence, on January 1,2003, iran author has been dead
for fifty years, all of her or his unpublished materials will lose copyright protection without regard to
her or his intent. After 2002, however, many unpublished materials will remain in the possession of
private individuals-not actually in the public domain. Under current law, privacy actions based on
state statutes or common law will become the only potential legal action to bar public disclosure of
materials not in private possession. I discuss privacy at notes 193-250 infra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 86-133 infra and accompanying text (discussing the fact/expression dichotomy).
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988); note 36 supra.
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the most to only a narrow fair use privilege.82 If the court finds infringe-
ment, the offending material can be enjoined and damages levied.83 The pos-
sibility of a first amendment defense seems doubtful under current case
law.84 In addition to claiming copyright infringement, a plaintiff may claim
violations of a right to privacy under state law, although she or he will not
likely succeed.8s
1. The fact/expression dichotomy.
The legal background. Copyright law permits the unfettered use of
"facts" taken from other works while restricting republication of another's
"expression."86 Although the fact/expression dichotomy has been widely
82. See notes 134-151 infra and accompanying text.
83. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-505 (1988). Damages usually will be small. Statutory damages, even if
the violation is willful, cannot exceed $100,000. § 504(c)(2). Actual damages can include profits
only if the profits are attributable to the infringement. § 504(b). Injunctions, see § 502, often more
attractive to the plaintiff, raise the problem of prior restraint and appear to transgress first amend-
ment principles. See New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 596-98 (2d Cir.
1989) (Oakes, J., concurring); New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1525-28; see also Gordon, supra note 66, at
1372 & n.139 (noting that courts have either issued an injunction and awarded damages, or granted
the plaintiff no relief). Furthermore, lawsuits cost both sides. The plaintiff's privacy and copyright
concerns may be jeopardized by the publication of even a few controversial passages in the judicial
opinion. Or, the defendant may voluntarily censor the controversial material, or be censored by the
publisher, to avoid the cost of trial. This result is particularly true for academic books, as the addi-
tional profits from publication with, as opposed to without, the material rarely justify the time and
expense of a prolonged legal battle.
84. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985) (stating
that copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech because copyright protects only the
form of expression and not the ideas expressed).
85. See, e.g., New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1505 (stating that a privacy claim would have failed "on
many grounds"). State privacy actions are not preempted by the copyright statute, see id. (citing
authorities); however, they usually fail. First, privacy interests generally terminate at death. See id.;
Lawrence Edward Savell, Right ofPrivacy-Appropriation ofa Person~Name, Portrait or Picture for
Advertising or Trade Purposes without Prior Written Consent: History and Scope in New York, 48
ALB. L. REv. 1,37-38 (1983); see also Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Re-
spect, 91 ETHICS 243 (1981) (discussing philosophical rationales for respecting the interests of the
dead). Second, the public interest may trump privacy rights. See New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1505;
Savell, supra, at 17 & n.73. Third, the state may refuse to recognize a common law privacy action.
See Savell, supra, at 2. Finally, statutory actions may be insufficient. They may not cover uses of
words or may require that an invasion be unreasonable and highly offensive. See Savell, supra. at 2-3
& n.4; see also Dana, supra note 58, at 394-408 (describing the limitations on privacy actions); Peppe,
supra note 45, at 433 n.95, 459, 464. For an interesting, anecdotal account of a successful privacy
action by a living subject against an author, see PATRICIA NASSIF ACTON, INVASION OF PRIVACY:
THE CROSS CREEK TRIAL OF MARJORIE KINNAN RAWLINGS (1988).
86. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90,96 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The biographer
who copies only facts incurs no risk of injunction; he has not taken copyrighted material. And it is
unlikely that the biographer will distort those facts by rendering them in words of his own choos-
ing.").
Numerous articles discuss the "fact/expression dichotomy" as applied to various works. See,
e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections ofFacts: A Theory for the Protection ofNonfiction
Literary Works, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 516 (1981) (as applied to nonfiction narratives and compila-
tions); Gary L. Francione, Facing The Nation: The Standards for Copyright. Infringement, and Fair
Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 519 (1986) (as applied to the "totality" approach,
whereby noncopyrightable facts secure some measure of protection when combined with copyright-
able expression); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of
Facts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1569 (1963) (as applied to the use of facts); Robert A. Gorman, Fact or
Fancy? The Implication for Copyright, 29 J. CoPYRIGHT SOC'Y 560 (1982) (as applied to "fact
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accepted as the preliminary issue that a court should raise when it deter-
mines copyrightability,87 the dichotomy does not appear in the Copyright
Act of 1976.88 Instead, the dichotomy arises from the copyright clause of
the Constitution and its "originality" requirement.89 The purpose of the
clause, as well as the manner in which it effectuates its purpose, is the source
of continuous debate.90 Nevertheless, the broad intent of the clause appears
to be the advancement of human knowledge through the original efforts of
works," works that "communicate information about our society and the world about us," e.g.,
maps, directories, biography, contrasted with works of imagination or fancy, e.g., music, sculpture,
and dance); William F. Patry, Copyright in Collections ofFacts: A Reply, COMM. & L., Oct. 1984, at
11 (as applied to nonfiction narratives); Christopher Hill, Copyright Protection for Historical Re-
search: A Defense of the Minority View, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 45 (1984) (student au-
thor) (as applied to the factual elements of historical work that are the product oforiginal research);
Jee Hi Park, The Chilling Effect of Overprotecting Factual Narrative Works, 11 HASTINGS COMM/
ENT L.J. 75, 88 (1988) (student author) (as applied to "an unspoken exception to the copyrightability
standard ... that increases protection for works of highly regarded authors); Edward K. Sato,
Copyright Law & Factual Works: Is Research Protected?-Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 58
WASH. L. REv. 619 (1983) (student author) (as applied to copyright protection in factual matters);
Elizabeth M. Saunders, Copyright Protection for Compilations ofFact: Does the Originality Standard
Allow Protection on the Basis ofIndustrious Collection?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 763 (1987) (stu-
dent author) (as applied to copyright protection of "intellectual labor" rather than mere mechanical
labor); John A. Taylor, The Uncopyrightability ofHistorical Matter: Protecting Form over Substance
& Fiction Over Fact, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 33 (1983) (student author) (as applied to
historical and biographical matter). One author discusses the nature of fact and expression, see Jane
C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope ofCopyright Protec-
tion in Works of History After Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 647
(1982); however, her analysis does not question the dichotomy's assumption that "facts" can be
determined.
87. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 ("No author may copyright •.• the facts he
narrates."); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980); H. BALL, supra note 78, at 240; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11[A], at 2-157 to -158 (citing cases) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COpy-
RIGHT]; COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 202.02(d) (1984) (staff manual) ("[a]
fact or event, as distinguished from the manner in which it is described in a particular work, is not
copyrightable"); id. § 318 (discussing "Facts, historical data, and 'news' "). The fact/expression
dichotomy applies to published and unpublished works. See Newman, supra note 57, at 14 ("No
decision of our Court casts even the slightest doubt upon the fundamental principle that factual
content may be copied, even though the facts are unearthed in unpublished writings.").
88. The statute states only that "in no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, ... concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988). One leading treatise suggests that the "fact" limit on copyright is codified in the statutory
refusal to extend copyright protection to "discovery." See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
87, § 2. 11[A], at 2-159. Although courts have noted the relation between "facts" and "expression,"
they do not appear to have adopted the argument that the fact/expression dichotomy has been
codified by the statute's use of "discovery." See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d
1365, 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT on fact and discovery, but omitting
any suggestion that "discovery" in the Act codifies the dichotomy).
89. "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The originality requirement derives from the
use of the term "Authors." Authors can only obtain protection for writings that originated from
them. "Facts may be discovered, but they are not created by an act of authorship." 1 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 87, § 2.11[A], at 2-157.
90. Scholars have haggled over a variety of possible purposes of the copyright monopoly.
Compare Gordon, supra note 66, at 1348-50 (discussing economic incentive purpose) with FISher,
supra note 44, at 1744-94 (suggesting that the purpose should be "to advance a just and attractive
intellectual culture").
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authors. Copyright's encouragement of creative endeavors and its promo-
tion of human knowledge imply that some information-"facts"--cannot be
subject to copyright's monopoly. As one court stated, "the cause of knowl-
edge is best served when history is 'the common property of all."91
Standing alone, the interpretation of the copyright clause as requiring
free access to facts might have been challenged by economic and property
justifications often advanced in support of granting copyright monopolies.
But the belief that "facts" cannot be monopolized draws strength from a
parallel idea inherent in the first amendment. As Judge Miner observed,
"the freedom of access to facts and ideas is the history of democracy";92
such freedom has promoted theories about freedom of speech, the market-
place of ideas, and invigorated democratic dialogue.93 Although the relation
between "expression" in copyright law and in the first amendment remains
unclear,94 both doctrines accept that some information must remain freely
accessible and usable by all.
Neither courts nor commentators draw a clear line between what consti-
tutes "fact" and what constitutes "expression."95 The obscurity becomes a
problem in an infringement case when a court confronts two sets of words:
first, the copyrighted work of the plaintiff, and second, the allegedly infring-
ing work of the defendant. Courts have indicated that the second set does
not infringe the first one only if the second uses solely those aspects of the
first which constitute "facts." The second set's use of "expression" from the
first set, even when paraphrased, infringes the first.96 Courts have not devel-
91. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
92. Miner, supra note 57, at 10.
93. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
breadth of "free expression"); id. § 12-4 (discussing academic freedom); id. § 12-19 (discussing
"right to know"); id. §§ 15-6 & 15-7 (discussing the shaping of societal beliefs: "[t]he guarantee of
free expression is inextricably linked to the protection and preservation of open and unfettered
mental activity").
94. Some commentators argue that the existence of the fact/expression and the idea/expres-
sion dichotomies, and the fair use defense, prevent copyright law from violating the first amendment.
According to the theory, the first amendment only protects facts and ideas, but does not protect the
use ofanother's expression. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556-60; New Era Publications, Int'l
v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989) ("An author's expression ofan idea ... is not
considered subject to the public's 'right to know.' "); James L. Swanson, Copyright versus the First
Amendment: Forecasting an End to the Storm, in 1988 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE
ARTS HANDBOOK 3 (J.D. Viera & R. Thome eds.) (arguing that a free speech privilege in copyright
will harm copyright by weakening its private property basis and will trivialize the first amendment).
Others contend that copyright doctrines do not suffice; they advocate first amendment claims in
copyright actions. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 66, at 1352 ("it is my belief that the public interest
in free speech should indeed 'trump' conflicting intellectual property rights in appropriate cases"),
1377, 1383 n.189, 1403 n.268; Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 435 (1989)
(stating that "copyright law has clearly begun to exceed its constitutional boundaries").
95. Expression has been defined as "the author's analysis or interpretation of events, the way
he or she structures material and marshals facts, the author's choice of words, and the emphasis the
author gives to particular developments." Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 461-
62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1977».
96. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811
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oped a coherent doctrine, but instead rely on intuition to distinguish "fact"
from "expression." Some courts have stated that "fact" encompasses all
"historical information."97 Others have suggested that "fact" should be
more narrowly defined.98 The Supreme Court explicitly has refused to ad-
dress this debate.99 It has acknowledged, however, that in certain circum-
stances "expression" may be necessary to convey "fact."lOO Courts have not
even consistently adopted a viewpoint-be it the author's, the judge's, or the
public's-from which to determine whether material is "fact" or "expres-
sion."101 Despite an absence of doctrinal guidance, courts continue to sift
uncopyrightable "fact" from copyrightable "expression."
The legal assumption. Underlying this separation of "fact" and "expres-
sion" rests an acceptance of objectivity, a concept that encompasses, as his-
torian Peter Novick observes,
a commitment to the reality of the past, and to truth as correspondence to
F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987). Because the fact/expression problem is difficult to conceptualize, I offer a
hypothetical. At age 87, Groucho Marx stated, "I'm as young as the day is long, and this has been a
very short day. Nothing lasts forever." Charlotte Chandler, Julius Henry Marx, at 100, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 6,1990, § 1, at 23, col. 2. Consider yourself a biographer. You discover that Groucho
wrote the line down but never published it. According to courts, the quote is expression; it is there-
fore copyrighted. Assume that you cannot persuade the copyright holders to give you permission to
use this expression. You believe, however, that the quote reveals Groucho's characteristic style of
humor, his power to communicate a perception in a short phrase, and his unfaltering optimism in
the last days of his life. Because you cannot quote Groucho, you struggle to capture the essense of
his words. But prose such as "At 87, Groucho wrote that his life had passed quickly," or "Groucho
compared his life to a rapidly passing day," does not demonstrate to the reader the humor, intelli-
gence, and courage of the original quote. The attempt to state a "fact" underlying the quotation
ignores and fails to convey the quotation's original ability to serve as a "fact" to instruct the reader
and advance your thesis about Groucho.
97. Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Hoehling v. Universal
Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that "the protection afforded the copyright
holder has never extended to history").
98. See Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 95-96 (stating that "the essence of infringement lies not in
taking a general theme or in coverage of the reports as events, but in appropriating the 'particular
expression through similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization' " (quoting
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976))).
99. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
100. See id. at 563 (suggesting that use ofFord's expression, the "smoking gun," to refer to the
White House tapes could not be copyrightable); see also New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt &
Co., 873 F.2d 576, 591-92 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, J., concurring) ("The law recognizes that words
themselves may be facts to be proven."). Current doctrine, however, recognizes entire quotations as
facts in an extremely narrow set of circumstances.
Melville Nimmer first suggested an analogous concept in distinguishing "idea" from expression.
If the idea were "wedded" to the expression such that the idea could not be communicated except by
using the particular expression, as in, for example, the photos taken at My Lai, the expression would
not be protected. Nimmer only addressed graphic representations. See I NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHT,
supra note 87, § 1.10[C].
Judge Newman has suggested a similar understanding for certain uses of expression. His propo-
sal would extend the scope of material subject to the fair use exception. He argues that "quotation of
expressive content for the purpose of fairly and accurately conveying factual information" falls
under the "purpose and character" inquiry in fair use doctrine. Newman, supra note 57, at 15; see
New Era, 884 F.2d at 662-63 (Newman, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., Olivier v. St. Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (holding that a
book based on a "factual" experience of spiritual communication with Phylos, the Thibetan, was in
the public domain, despite disavowing any belief in the existence of the spiritual world). In reaching
its decision, the court ignored its own viewpoint and assumed the author's.
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that reality; a sharp separation between knower and known, between fact
and value, and, above all, between history and fiction. Historical facts are
seen as prior to and independent of interpretation . . . . Truth is one,
not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are "found," not
"made."102
The fact/expression dichotomy embraces objectivity. Having decided that
some knowledge must remain outside of copyright,103 the doctrine dubs this
realm "fact," comprised of information existing "prior to and independent of
interpretation." Copyright protects only the creative additions of the au-
thor, which the doctrine entitles "expression." Thus, judges must sort fact
from expression. But their judgment that a series of words constitutes an
uncopyrightable "fact" does not involve an inquiry into how the author uses
the material-for example, to establish a claim that something was true or
happened. Courts rarely engage in deeper analysis, or ask tough questions
such as "Why should we call these words 'facts'?" or "How do we know that
these words are 'expression'?" Their decisions typically rest upon an "every-
one knows it when they see it" intuition that certain series of words are
"facts" while others are not. 1M And even ifmost would agree that the state-
ment, "On October 1, 1990, George Bush was president of the United
States" is a "fact," the sets of words confronting judges-particularly those
that arise in the complex context of primary source research and analysis-
are less susceptible to easy categorization. But judges do not alter or recon-
sider traditional fact!expression analysis. 105 Envisioning a historical world
102. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 1-2 (1988).
103. See notes 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
104. Other areas of the law also rely on a judicial ability to label certain things "fact"-for
example, appellate courts' review of administrative decisions. See 5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:9, at 368 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the law-fact distinction in
review of administrative action, noting "a delightful observation as early as 1922 can be appreciated:
'whether a particular question is to be treated as a question of law or a question of fact is not in itself
a question of fact, but a highly artificial question of law' " (citing Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the
Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1922»). Moreover, legal history teaches us to be wary of
reliance on intuition and common sense. "Common sense" visions of the world often have proven to
be solely the vision of a particular group. For example, the law accepted that women or persons of
color did not possess the same rights as many white men, or valorized as "facts" particular notions
ofjustice. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (describing early Ameri-
can "public opinion": "They [African Americans] had for more than a century before been regarded
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race ... and so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."). See generally CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
105. In Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), Judge Leval em-
ployed a rather unusual approach to the fact/expression dichotomy. He first found that "virtually
every passage taken by Hamilton from the 59 letters consist[ed] primarily ofa report of such histori-
cal fact (or of an idea) which is not protected by the copyright." Id. at 418. He believed, however,
that whatever "fact" existed, it could be separated from the "expression," and so he proceeded with
the fair use analysis.
The consequences of such a method can be seen in the "pedestrian" issue in Salinger. At trial,
Hamilton initially responded to a question, on cross examination, about his use of a quotation by
stating that he " 'wanted to convey the fact that [Salinger] was adopting an ironic tone .. .''' Salin-
ger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1987). The court ignored Hamilton's proposi-
tion that use of the expression was the fact; instead, it focused on Hamilton's responses that without
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in which "facts" actually do occur, the doctrine assumes that one can distin-
guish "expression" from independent, objective "fact."
Questioning the validity of the assumption. The assumption that one can
distinguish "expression" from objective "fact" has been debated extensively.
The following discussion briefly addresses a few representative critiques of
the objectivity assumption, particularly those of legal commentators, histori-
ans, and others who have questioned our ability to distinguish "fact" from
"expression." Legal academics have suggested that the attempt to establish
unambiguous, definable "fact" may be pointless activity bound to fail. I06
Some observe that "truth" and "fact" exist only with respect to certain per-
spectives; all statements and assertions are not objective, but "perspectival,"
implying desired ends and considered beginnings. I07 Even those theorists
who believe that some vision of truth might exist quarrel with simplistic
attempts by courts to determine it. lOS
Historians have discussed the limitations of objectivity more extensively,
and consequently, have altered their perception of the historical profession.
Carl L. Becker, addressing the American Historical Association in 1932,
observed:
the quotation, the sentence would be "pedestrian." Id. Judge Newman concluded that "when deal-
ing with copyrighted expression, a biographer . . . may frequently have to content himself with
reporting only the fact of what his subject did, even if he thereby pens a 'pedestrian' sentence." Id.
at 96-97. JUdge Newman failed to consider whether "reporting the fact" required using the expres-
sion. After the trial, Hamilton's argument that he should be free to quote the words as fact returned
to haunt him. A reviewer argued that Hamilton had mischaracterized Salinger's letters. See New
Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1503 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting
Mordechai Richler, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1988, § 7 (Book Review), at 7).
In New Era, Judge Leval did not even waste space with fact/expression analysis. Assuming the
quotations were expression, he began with fair use. 695 F. Supp. at 1499.
106. See, e.g., BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE (1988) (arguing
that "facts" are constructed; therefore, judicial decisionmakers should focus on the narrative coher-
ence and integrity of the speaker); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1368-69 (1985) (arguing that many evi-
dentiary rules and other aspects of the trial process are better explained by a need to promote public
acceptance of verdicts than by a desire to search for truth); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2086 (1989) (illustrating the difficulty in determining "fact" in a
rape case, where judges described the same physical movements of the defendant, who placed his
hands on a woman's neck, as "heavy caressing" and "light choking").
107. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIS-
COURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 146, 155 (1987) ("But in a society of gender inequality, the speech of
the powerful impresses its view upon the world, concealing the truth of powerlessness under that
despairing acquiescence that provides the appearance of consent and makes protest inaudible as well
as rare."); Scheppele, supra note 106, at 2082 ("stories may diverge ... not because one is true and
another false, but rather because they are both self-believed descriptions coming from different
points of view informed by different background assumptions about how to make sense of events");
cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature ofConstitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Mod-
ern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1989) ("it is the most vulnerable, the most forgotten,
whose perspective is least akin to that of the lawmaker or judge or bureaucrat and whose fate is most
forcefully determined by the law's overall design-by its least visible, most deeply embedded gaps
and deflections").
108. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 413 (1986) (suggesting a theory ofjudicial deci-
sionmaking viewing law as integrity-"an interpretive, self-reflective attitude addressed to politics in
the grandest sense"); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (suggesting a need for "reflective
equilibrium through which proposed conceptions are weighed to effectuate continued revision in
personal judgments").
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Left to themselves, the facts do not speak; left to themselves they do not
exist, not really, since for all practical purposes there is not fact until some
one affirms it. . .. However "hard" or "cold" they may be, historical facts
are after all not material substances which, like bricks or scantlings, possess
definite shape and clear, persistent outline. . .. A brick retains its form and
pressure wherever placed; but the form and substance of historical facts,
having a negotiable existence only in literary discourse, vary with the words
employed to convey them. Since history is not part of the external material
world, but an imaginative reconstruction of vanished events, its form and
substance are inseparable: in the realm ofliterary discourse substance, being
an idea, is form; and form, conveying the idea, is substance. I09
The argument has been debated and redebated by historians for over a hun-
dred years, waxing and waning in popularity.ll0 Peter Novick argues that
social, political, cultural, and professional contexts explain the acceptance
and rejection of objectivity by historians in the United States. Immediately
prior to the 1960s, the objectivity assumption created little controversy.
During the 1960s, however, "the notion of a determinate and unitary truth
about the physical and social world, approachable if not ultimately reach-
able, came to be seen by a growing number of scholars as a chimera."ll1
Most historians did not abandon altogether the idea of doing history; rather,
they began to reexamine the nature of the historical enterprise. IIZ The grow-
ing recognition that historical judgment is ubiquitous, as one historian ob-
served, seems to "doom the simple-minded objectivist myth."113 Instead of
objectivity, historians may adopt the only assumption possible: "that the
contest of interpretations, the play of meanings, must not be closed, that the
conversation of humankind must be kept open."114 If the assumption of
objectivity is at least momentarily neglected and the historical enterprise re-
constructed, historians will succeed in a challenge that the legal doctrine has
refused to address. lls
109. Carl L. Becker, Everyman His Own Historian, 37 AM. HIsr. REv. 221, 233-34 (1932).
Becker was criticized by his colleagues for his address. P. NOVICK, supra note 102, at 250-78. Sid-
ney Terr, a historian at Ohio State University, told Becker that the address "'caused no end of
confusion among the ... scientifically minded in the department.'" P. NOVICK, supra note 102, at
259 (quoting Letter from Terr to Becker (Dec. 18, 1933». Others were pleased that Becker "killed
the notion that facts have any meaning in themselves, apart from that shed upon them by our own
mind." Id. (quoting Letter from Preserved Smith to Becker (Feb. 2, 1932».
110. See generally P. NOVICK, supra note 102.
111. Id. at 523.
112. See, e.g., David Harlan, Intellectual History and the Return ofLiterature, 94 AM. HIsr.
REv. 581, 596 (1989); David A. Hollinger, The Return ofthe Prodigal: The Persistence ofHistorical
Knowing, 94 AM. HIsr. REv. 610 (1989).
113. Kloppenberg, supra note 73, at 1026.
114. John E. Toews, Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy ofMeaning
and the Irreducibility of Experience, 92 AM. HIsr. REv. 879, 904 (1987) (summarizing Richard
Rorty's suggestion); cf Kloppenberg, supra note 73, at 1028, 1030:
Beyond the noble dream of scientific objectivity and the nightmare of complete relativism
lies the terrain of pragmatic truth, which provides us with hypotheses, provisional synthe-
ses, imaginative but warranted interpretations, which then provide the basis for continuing
inquiry and experimentation. Such historical writing can provide knowledge that is useful
even if it must be tentative.
115. Cf Kloppenberg, supra note 73, at 1030 ("historical truth-like all truth in a world that
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Such a refusal cannot be the consequence of inadequate warning. His-
torians have long criticized the very factiexpression dichotomy that the law
accepts. One historian writes: "The way in which men evaluate reality is
historically part of that reality. It is itself a fact. So there is not any question
of a dichotomy between subjective interpretation and objective fact: for, as in
any scientific law, the interpretation is part of the fact."116 Others echo the
understanding that whatever "facts" may be, they cannot be easily sliced
away from the way in which they are expressed.117
Despite the academic criticism, and the example historians set by writing
history even after forsaking the objectivity assumption, the fact/expression
dichotomy persists. Judges passively accept a world of objective, unchang-
ing "facts" and "truths" without perceiving, at least explicitly, the epistomo-
logical consequences. llS They have not recognized the fact/expression
has moved beyond the discredited dualisms of both positivism and idealism-must be made, ques-
tioned, and reinterpreted").
116. Gordon Lelf, The Past and the New. in THE VITAL PASf: WRmNGS ON THE USES OF
HISTORY 58, 62 (S. Vaughn ed. 1985) [hereinafter THE VITAL PASf].
117. See Lionel Gossman, History and Literature: Reproduction or Signification, in THE WRIT-
ING OF HISTORY: LITERARY FORM AND HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 3, 29 (R. Canary & H.
Kozicki eds. 1978) (recognizing that "history constructs its objects, and that its objects are objects of
langnage, rather than entities of which the words are in some way copies"); Gerda Lerner, The
Necessity ofHistory and the Professional Historian. in THE VITAL PASf, supra note 116, at 1M, 107
("Making history means form.giving and meaning-giving. There is no way to extricate the form-
giving aspect of history from what we are pleased to call the facts."); Louis O. Mink, Narrative Form
as a Cognitive Instrument, in LOUIS O. MINK: HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 182, 201 (B. Fay, E.
Golob & R. Vann eds. 1987):
"Events" (or more precisely, descriptions of events) are not the raw materials out of which
narratives are constructed; rather an event is an abstraction from a narrative. An event
may take five seconds or five months, but in either case whether it is one event or many
depends not on a definition of "event" but on a particular narrative construction which
generates the event's appropriate description.
See also DAVID BOUCHER, TEXTS IN CONTEXT: REVISIONIST METHODS FOR STUDYING THE Hls-
TORY OF IDEAS (1985); Leon Pompa, Truth and Fact in History, in SUBSTANCE AND FORM IN
HISTORY: A COLLECTION OF EssAYS IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 171 (L. Pompa & W. Dray eds.
1981).
118. Judicial adherence to the fact/expression dichotomy has lead to unusual analyses even
outside the arena of unpublished materials. For example, in Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650
F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981), the court considered a jury instruction that research is copyrightable.
The plaintiff, a Miami Herald reporter, had collaborated with the victim of a bizarre kidnapping
incident on a book about the crime. ld. at 1367. The defendant, Universal City Studios, had writ-
ten, produced, and aired a television movie about the incident. The jury found that the movie in-
fringed Miller's copyright in the book. ld. The appellate judge concluded that the trial judge erred
in instructing the jury that research is copyrightable.
The valuable distinction in copyright law between facts and the expression of facts cannot
be maintained if research is held to be copyrightable. There is no rational basis for distin-
guishing between facts and the research involved in obtaining facts. To hold that research
is copyrightable is no more or no less to hold that the facts discovered as a result of re-
search are entitled to copyright protection.
ld. at 1372. Regardless of one's belief in the protection that should be accorded original researchers,
the judge's use of the fact/expression dichotomy permitted an escape from an exploration of what
"research" is. The judge perceived "research" as fact; it could not mean, as was argned to the court,
"the original expression by the author of the results of the research." ld. at 1369. Hence, assuming
that facts exist, and that the plaintiff's research merely represented a process of gathering these facts,
the judge could not perceive any other argument permitting some sort of protection for the plaintiff's
book.
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dichotomy's underlying assumption of objectivity. They have not ques-
tioned what many argue stands as an archaic remnant of a more assured
time and a passive acceptance of "common sense" intuition.
Effect on biography. As expounded by the courts, the fact/expression
dichotomy severely restricts biographers. Recent cases reveal that courts, in
general, presume that the unpublished writings of an author are "expres-
sion" and thus protected by copyright. Absent fair use, a biographer in-
fringes whenever she or he quotes or too closely paraphrases such
expression. To tell their stories, then, biographers may use only that some-
thing else, that "fact" underlying the "expression."
Although biographers understand the fair use doctrine, their awareness
of the fact/expression dichotomy is less widespread. Biographers may not
even realize that the entire fair use analysis follows a determination that the
information used was "expression" and not "fact." Their daily research,
however, demonstrates that the notion of fact often gives way to a morass of
conflicting interpretation. Despite this knowledge, they do not believe that
the idea of "fact" has no value.1l9 Nevertheless, biographers are all too
aware that establishing "fact" is extremely difficult. 120 As Leon Edel noted,
in biography, facts "are always soft as flesh, and as yielding."121
Biographers read diary entries and letters, searching for an understand-
ing of their subjects. But the diary entry or letter bears an ambiguous rela-
tion to the "life" that it describes,122 for biographical research abounds with
deceiving historical texts. 123 Richard Ellmann describes biographical inves-
tigation: "where everything can stand for its opposite, where fantasies and
facts intertwine, we look desperately for a position in time and space. Freud
is supposed to have said that there are times when a cigar is just a cigar. But
119. See W. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 48-50 (demonstrating that even believers in "objective"
biography are aware of the problems of fact); IRA BRUCE NADEL, BIOGRAPHY: FICflON, FACT AND
FORM 4-11 (1984). For a comparison of views on facts, see D. NOVARR, supra note 11.
120. I spoke to a number of biographers, none of whom believed that the "fact" underlying a
quotation could be separated easily from the quoted "expression." E.g., Interview with John Milton
Cooper, supra note 67; Telephone interview with Thomas C. Reeves, Professor, Department of His-
tory, University of Wisconsin-Parkside (Aug. II, 1989); Interview with Linda Simon, supra note 67.
121. L. EDEL, supra note 10, at 214.
122. See OSCAR HANDLIN, TRUTH IN HISTORY 165-93 (1979) (noting that language generally
does not accurately reflect reality, e.g., "laissez-faire" did not originally mean "economic freedom");
THE HISTORIAN AS DETECflVE: EssAYS ON EVIDENCE (R. Winks ed. 1969) (compiling 26 essays
from writers as diverse as Carl L. Becker and Russell Baker on historians' inexact and inferential
search for "evidence"); M. LoMASK, supra note 14, at 32 (noting that "[p]ure facts are few and
far between. . •. [M]uch of biography consists not of facts but of probabilities ").
123. Published autobiographies create similar problems. For example, New York Times jour-
nalist Walter Duranty "never once saw his parents or his sister after his graduation from Cambridge,
although they lived on for decades; [but,] in an autobiography written in his last years •.. he conve-
niently orphaned himself, an only child, when he was 10." Francine du Plessh Gray, N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1990, § 7 (Book Review), at 3, col. 2; cf. Berke Breathed, Bloom County, Washington Post,
June 27, 1989, at D23 (© 1990. Washineton Post Writers Group. Reprinted with permission.):
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how to recognize these tranquil moments of simple identity?"124
Walt Whitman, for example, altered "him" to "her" in his writing.125
Alexander Pope, Horace Walpole, and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu "re-
wrote their own letters with an eye to posterity."126 Diarists' recollections
of the same event often differ. 127 Until the Cornell collection of James
Joyce's sexually explicit letters was revealed, Joyce was thought to be "an
overcontrolled, mannered correspondent."128 And John Steinbeck, who ex-
tensively discussed his work in his private papers, "really tells very little
about what he is thinking ...."129 On the other hand, Harriet Beecher
Stowe's letters to George Eliot, one of which effused "I love you-and 1 talk
to you sometimes when 1 am quite alone so earnestly that 1 should think you
must know it even across an ocean," might signal stronger emotions to a
reader unaware of the common use of such intimate language by nineteenth-
century female correspondents.130 Uncovering one simple succinct "fact" in
these words is therefore quite difficult. Thomas Carlyle asked, "What are
your historical Facts; still more your biographical? Wilt thou know a Man,
above all a Mankind, by stringing-together beadrolls of what thou namest
Facts?"131 The belief that these words do not communicate important infor-
124. RICHARD ELLMANN, Freud and Literary Biography, in A LONG THE RIVERRUN 256, 269
(1989).
125. See Justin Kaplan, The Naked Selfand Other Problems, in TELLING LIVES: THE BIOGRA-
PHER'S ART 36, 54 (M. Pachter ed. 1985) [hereinafter TELLING LIVES]. Kaplan notes that Whit-
man also reordered sequences of his love poems, removed pages from his notebooks, and exchanged
men's initials for a numerical code.
126. JAMES L. CLIFFORD, FROM PUZZLES TO PORTRAITS: PROBLEMS OF A LITERARY BIOG-
RAPHER 4-5 (1970); see also R. ALTICK, supra note 1, at 200-03 (discussing Pope's and Walpole's
revisions of personalletters). Professor Rampersad notes that Langston Hughes's papers appear to
change after 1942-43, when he realized they might be seen by larger number of people. See Talk by
Arnold Rampersad, supra note 70.
127. J. CLIFFORD, supra note 126, at 75-79.
128. BRENDA MADDOX, NORA: A BIOGRAPHY OF NORA JOYCE 386 (1988).
129. Wilson Snipes, A Preliminary to Literary Biography: The Chronicle Collection ofSelected
Documents, 9 BIOGRAPHY 126, 137 (1986) (quoting Steinback biographer, Jackson J. Benson, in an
analysis of versions of the chronicle method of biography--creating a biographical life by selecting
material written by the subject).
130. See Marlene Springer, Stowe and Eliot: An Epistolary Friendship, 9 BIOGRAPHY 59, 80
(1986) (quoting Letter from Stowe to Eliot (May 25, 1989)).
131. THOMAS CARLYLE, SARTOR RESARTUS 203 (C. Harrold ed. 1937), quoted in I.B.
NADEL, supra note 119, at 5.
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mation is unrealistic, for their very expression helps us understand the
subject.
Confronted with judicial presumption under the fact/expression dichot-
omy, the biographer must ignore the "fateful uncertainty"132 so often evi-
dent in literary texts; she or he must abandon the knowledge that the
"expression"-the very words used by the subject-often is as close as a
biographer will come to "fact." To declare the underlying "fact" of the "ex-
pression" or rephrase the "expression" may tell a different story than that
told by the original writer. And no reminder will appear to caution the
reader about the interpretive nature of the alteration. I33 Thus, because the
biography permitted by the fact/expression dichotomy prohibits use of quo-
tations without the permission of the copyright owner, the biographer must
divide the unauthorized quotations into two categories. The first will appear
as mere footnote sources for statements presented in the biography with the
authority of "fact." The second, "expression," will disappear from human
history.
In sorting out "fact" from "expression," the biographer becomes an un-
conscious adherent to the law's acceptance of objectivity. The resulting bi-
ography will give the reader no qualms over her or his assumption of
objectivity. "Facts" will be supported by footnotes to obscure references or
not supported at all. Biographical subjects will appear to have easily de-
scribed motives and unambiguous emotions. The inability to quote unpub-
lished materials will imply that an author's tone and voice do not change
according to the time (e.g., before or after fame or notoriety), place (e.g., at
work, at home, on vacation), or manner (e.g., a letter to a family member,
lover, or enemy, a diary, or a published book).
Moreover, the inability to use quotations as fact to support a controver-
sial or unusual interpretation discourages insightful and meaningful biogra-
phies. In their place will appear books that reinforce popularly accepted
"truths" about the subject and avoid primary document research; after all,
what's the point of research if a good unpublished quotation can be used
only where the biographer can find some way to rephrase it as a "fact."
Hence, through the fact/expression dichotomy and its underlying assump-
tion of objectivity, the law nudges biographers into writing biographies that
will be passively and unquestioningly read.
132. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, BIOGRAPHY: THE CRAFT AND THE CALLING 70 (1969).
Bowen uses this phrase in discussing the difficulty of communicating the existence of past uncer-
tainty when the reader knows the outcome. I believe the phrase aptly describes the nearly opposite
situation the biographer confronts in using unpublished materials: communicating to the reader the
uncertainty of the biographer's interpretation while simultaneously stating the interpretation in a
book-a format we tend to perceive as "the truth."
133. In Salinger v. Random House, Inc., Judge Leval noted, "[t]o the extent [the biographer]
departs from the words of the letters, he distorts, sacrificing both accuracy and vividness of descrip-
tion." 650 F. Supp. 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). To comprehend his point, imagine funhouse mirrors.
A biographer's departure may be an elongated version of the subject's words. The reader, however,
does not perceive that she or he is inside the funhouse and consequently accepts the reflection as one
seen in an ordinary mirror.
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2. The narrow fair use interpretation.
The legal background. The other copyright doctrine that affects biogra-
phers is fair use, an affirmative statutory defense to infringement.134 The
text of the 1976 statute seems to apply fair use to all copyrighted materi-
als. 135 Courts, however, have limited severely the breadth of the fair use
privilege for unpublished materials136 by implying a published/unpublished
distinction into the second fair use factor-the nature of the copyrighted
work.137 Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman, in his statement for the re-
cent congressional hearings,138 wrote that "nothing in the current statute
prohibits the application of fair use to unpublished works. Nor do any other
court decisions prohibit any use of unpublished works. There is certainly a
dispute over the scope of the availability of fair use to unpublished works
...."139 Regardless of the outcome of the congressional action, the majority
134. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988); see note 36 supra; see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE
PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 18-64 (1985). Prior to the 1976 Act, which codified the judicially-
crafted fair use doctrine, fair use could have been seen as "falling outside the orbit of copyright
protection and hence never an infringement at all." Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works
(1958), in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 58, at 781, 784; see also Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, in 2 STUDIES ON CoPYRIGHT, supra
note 58, at 1199, 1224-25. After two Supreme COurt cases exploring fair use (Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), and Sony COrp. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417 (1984)), the doctrine has received increased scholarly attention. Some commentators
have insisted that the purpose of fair use is "the encouragement of creativity." W. PATRY, supra, at
xii; see also Dratler, supra note 44, at 246-47. Others have sought to modify fair use to achieve
greater substantive goals, see Fisher, supra note 44, at 1780-83, or to employ fair use as an "equitable
rule of reason" to balance the seemingly monopolistic tendencies of copyright, see John Shelton
Lawrence, Copyright Law, Fair Use, and the Academy: An Introduction, in FAIR USE AND FREE
INQUIRY 3, 10 (J.S. Lawrence & B. Timberg 2d ed. 1989). Professor Gordon notes that the fair use
doctrine aims "to ensure that rights over copying will not significantly inhibit liberties that are essen-
tial to human self-expressiveness or to political life." Gordon, supra note 66, at 1384 n.189. Finally,
some have seen fair use as a way for copyright to avoid conflict "lith the first amendment. See
Swanson, supra note 94, at 10-11. Others have suggested that direct first amendment claims be
added to those of fair use. See Harry N. Rosenfield, The American Constitution. Free Inquiry, and
the Law, in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY, supra, at 295-96; Yen, supra note 94. But see Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970) (explaining that unlike the fair use defense, a first amendment defense
would not falter when confronted with an impairment of marketability). For a discussion of the
issue prior to the Supreme COurt's Harper & Row decision, see W. PATRY, supra, at 461-73; see also
text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
135. For the text of the statute, see note 36 supra.
136. In Harper & Row, the COurt stated that "the scope of fair use is narrower "lith respect to
unpublished works." 471 U.S. at 564; see note 44 supra.
137. See Harper & Row. 471 U.S. at 563-64; cf Dratler, supra note 44, at 284-85 (advocating
making unpublished status a separate factor). The published/unpublished distinction within fair use
appears identical to the old published/unpublished dichotomy. This dichotomy developed in re-
sponse to the 1909 Act, which granted federal copyright at publication, leaving unpublished works
covered by the broad and perpetual, albeit somewhat ineffective, common law copyright protection.
See Dana, supra note 58, at 357-59. The 1976 Act replaced "publication" with "creation" or "fixa-
tion" as the dividing line between statutory and common law protection. COpyright protection ex-
tends for the life of the author plus fifty years following death. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). For a further
discussion of the effect of the 1909 and 1976 Acts on unpublished documents, see Dana, supra note
58, at 353-64.
138. See notes 5, 6, & 61-64 supra and accompanying texts.
139. Hearings. supra note 6, at 63 (statement of Ralph Oman) (emphasis in original); see id. at
5 (statement of Barbara Ringer) ("there now seems to be considerable agreement among the majority
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of commentators have not suggested eliminating the distinction. l40 Repre-
sentative Kastenmeier stated that "[t]he bills seek to clarify that, while the
unpublished nature of a work is certainly relevant to the fair use analysis, it
should not alone be determinative."141
The published/unpublished distinction in fair use analysis derives from
the perpetual copyright granted unpublished materials under common law
copyright.142 The special consideration given to "unpublished" status draws
on two concepts: the common law copyright in letters and more modem
theories regarding a right not to speak. First, with regard to common law
copyright, letters raised the need for special consideration of unpublished
writings. Although written with the intention of being placed in another's
possession, letters quickly became subject to unique rules. 143 The common
law recognized that the sender of a letter retains copyright, even though the
recipient owns the physical object. l44 The recipient's possession of the letter
included the rights to display it to limited numbers of people, to sell it, and
to destroy it.145 Because the sender retained a right of first publication, how-
ever, the recipient could publish only sections of the letter, and only in nar-
row circumstances.146
and minority judges •.. that the fair use doctrine can apply to copying of unpublished works [Le.,
there is no per se rule]"); see also Benedict, supra note 58, at 879-81 (arguing that fair use should
apply to published and unpublished documents).
140. For example, copyright expert Barbara Ringer testified that equating published and un-
published documents could have "mischievous effects." Washington Insider, supra note 62 (charac-
terizing oral testimony of Barbara Ringer given at congressional hearings on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263).
But see Barbara Ringer, Copyright and the Historian, 2 BIOGRAPHY 1, 13 (1979) (stating, after earlier
discussing the 1976 Act's coverage of unpublished works, that "fair use applies to all users and to all
sorts of works").
141. Hearings, supra note 6, at 3 (opening remarks of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier); see also
id. at 5 (statement of Judge Leval); id. at 1 (statement of Judge Miner).
142. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 42Q.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discuss-
ing fair use doctrine for unpublished materials with reference to common law copyright for unpub-
lished Hemingway letters); note 136 supra.
143. This subject has received much scholarly comment. See, e.g., Michael Cohn, Rights in
Private Letters, 8 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 291 (1961) (discussing the dichotomy between physical
object and "incorporeal right of ownership in the intellectual creation"); Hauhart, supra note 58;
Alan Lee Zegas, Personal Letters: A Dilemma for Copyright and Privacy Law, 33 RUTGERS L. REv.
134 (1980) (student author) (discussing the historical development of the protection of private writ-
ings, including letters, from unauthorized uses); Personal Letters: In Need ofa Law ofTheir Own, 44
IOWA L. REv. 705 (1959) (student author) [hereinafter Personal Letters: In Need ofa Law] (reexam-
ining existing law and how it affects the recipient and sender of private letters). Early American
cases adopted English law: sending a letter did not transfer copyright, even as a gift, to the recipient.
See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 346-47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). These cases
did not distinguish between letters of a "mere private or domestic character" and those of a literary
character. ld. at 346.
144. Hauhart, supra note 58, at 249-54; Zegas, supra note 143, at 139-42 (1980); Personal Let-
ters: In Need ofa Law, supra note 143, at 707.(J9. Showing the letter to sufficient numbers of people
also established publication. See Hauhart, supra note 58, at 251.
145. See Cohn, supra note 143, at 292-93; Hauhart, supra note 58, at 248-49; Zegas, supra note
143, at 137-39; Personal Letters: In Need ofa Law, supra note 143, at 705.(J7. Letters could not be
sold as part of the estate to pay debts. ld. at 707.
146. See Cohn, supra note 143, at 296-99; Hauhart, supra note 58, at 25Q.54; Zegas, supra note
143, at 141-44. For example, publication was permitted to vindicate reputation or innocence on
justifiable occasions. Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 346-47. If the recipient was the government, publication
was permitted for public purposes despite the sender's objections. See id. at 347.
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Second, the "right to decide when and whether [a work] will be made
public"147 has been linked to a right not to speak. The Court stated in
Harper & Row that the
right of first publication implicates a threshold decision by the author
whether and in what form to release his work. ... Because the potential
damage to the author from judicially enforced "sharing" of the first publica-
tion right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substantial, the bal-
ance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair use inevitably shifts.148
The Court and commentators have attempted to justify an author's right not
to speak on the basis of notions of economic property,149 traditional first
amendment theory on the right not to speak,150 and broad concerns about
privacy.151
The legal assumption. Regardless of doctrinal justifications, the narrow
fair use defense for unpublished documents presumes that until an author
has published, she or he has signified an intent not to publish. The Senate
report relied upon this assumption in analyzing reproduction for classroom
purposes: "the work is unavailable ... [as] the result of a deliberate choice
on the part of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances the copy-
right owner's 'right of first publication' would outweigh any 'other
needs.' "152 The United States Copyright Office shares the assumption.I53
Catharine MacKinnon mockingly describes this fanciful world of presump-
tive equality: "If they write about it, they will be published. If certain ex-
periences are never spoken about, if certain people or issues are seldom
heard from, it is supposed that silence has been chosen."154 Moreover, using
"unpublished" as a proxy for authorial intent complements copyright's be-
147. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985).
148. ld. at 553.
149. Because an author's unpublished work is property, it falls under one of the "bundle of
rights" conferred by section 106 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). See Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 546-47.
150. The Court noted that the first amendment's right of free expression "includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559
(citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977». Judge Newman, however, would disagree.
He writes: "[A] private writing is only the barest extension of a private thought. Not even the most
unyielding First Amendment argument ... could seriously maintain that there is a right to let the
world know the thoughts each one of us entertains in the recesses of our minds." Newman, supra
note 77, at 471.
151. See Gordon, supra note 66, at 1376 & n.156; Newman, supra note 77, at 477. See also
Cohn, supra note 143, at 296; Hauhart, supra note 58, at 254-59; Zegas, supra note 143, at 149-50;
Personal Letters: In Need ofa Law, supra note 143, at 712-15. Judge Miner finds all threejustifica-
tions plausible. He suggests that "an author should have the right and the opportunity to hone,
polish, refine, revise or discard his or her work prior to" public dissemination. Miner, supra note 57,
at 9.
152. S. REp. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1975).
153. See Benedict, supra note 58, at 869 n.42 (noting that the staff "consistently refers to au-
thors as having 'chosen' not to publish, suggesting a conscious decision by authors" (quoting U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REpORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: LIBRARY REPRODUCTION OF
CoPYRIGHTED WORKS 105-06 (1983»; see also id. at 879. But see Hearings, supra note 6, at 65
(statement of Ralph Oman).
154. C. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 107, at 163, 168.
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lief that monopolies promote creativityiSS and the broader legal understand-
ing that the realization of rights does not require assistance. IS6 Having
assumed that nonpublication signals an unquestionable intent not to publish,
current doctrine makes it nearly impossible for any author quoting or para-
phrasing unpublished expression to prevail in a fair use defense. IS?
Questioning the validity ofthe assumption. The assumption that "unpub-
lished" status tells us anything about authorial intent is open to dispute. ISS
Literary theorists IS9 and philosophersI60 have questioned the usefulness, and
even the existence, of authorial intent. Rather than explore the critique of
intent from these academic perspectives, I adopt a less theoretical and more
illustrative approach. My examples fall into two rough categories and cast
doubt on whether we can ever determine author's intent. Although the pub-
lished/unpublished distinction in fair use pretends otherwise, authorial in-
tent is a notoriously complex issue.
First, economic, social, and cultural factors ensure that not all unpub-
lished manuscripts will be published. Publication usually depends on ac-
ceptance of the manuscript by a publishing house or magazine. A published
author often finds getting published easy, while many an unpublished author
will struggle. The manuscript's acceptance also depends on public demand
for a given genre or style. Moreover, other factors may influence the deci-
sion, as the public may not want to read certain authors for gender,I6I ra-
155. Two disquieting notions arise when one questions whether economic incentives actually
do affect whether authors choose to "publish." First, if there are authors who would write regard-
less ofcompensation or who would allow the uncompensated use of their material, then the extent to
which monopoly exerts influence seems questionable. Second, if authors cannot be published be-
cause either their works will not achieve sufficient economic profit or the monopoly has created a
narrow public demand, then the ability of the monopoly to create a diverse and open market seems
questionable. Whether economic incentives provide a rationale for copyright, of course, has been
much debated. For economic analyses, see Fisher, supra note 44, at 1698-1744; Gordon, supra note
66, at 1388-94.
156. For example, if an author possesses a right to publish, and she or he does not exercise the
right, two conclusions are possible. Either the author wants to exercise the right but cannot do so
because of social conditions (see text accompanying notes 161-167 infra), or the nonexercise of the
right represents a conscious decision. Courts, however, do not favor the idea that the government
has affirmative obligations to overcome those social conditions that make it difficult to exercise
rights. Cf Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1979), reh'gdenied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (govern-
ment need not provide federal funding for abortions even though the Constitution has been held to
guarantee the right to an abortion). Hence, the intentional interpretation is preferable.
157. Floyd Abrams has argued that the question of whether expression is published or unpub-
lished ends the four factor analysis "before it begins." See Hearings, supra note 6, at 13 (statement of
Floyd Abrams).
158. See Benedict, supra note 58, at 880 (noting that the "presumption that all authors of
unpublished materials consciously intended to avoid publication ... may seem naive to historians");
Kernochan, supra note 58, at 322; see also Cohn, supra note 143, at 296-98.
159. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSic-TEXT 142 (S.
Heath trans. 1977).
160. The literature of paternalism offers one exploration of the philosophical intent issue. See
generally PATERNALISM (R. Sartorius ed. 1984).
161. For example, many of the characteristics for which nineteenth-century male authors were
admired would have been considered "unbearably presumptuous in a woman writer." CAROLYN G.
HEILBRUN, WRITING A WOMAN'S LIFE 111 (1988). Out of necessity, many women adopted male
pseudonyms, the most famous being the Brontes (Acton, Currer, and Ellis Bell), Marion Evans
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cial,162 class,163 ethnic, or political reasons. The subject matter may also
doom the manuscript. For example, Virginia Woolf faced "the ridicule, mis-
ery, and anxiety the patriarchy holds in store for those who express their
anger about the enforced destiny of women."164 Not every writer can find a
press to express her or his views. The legal doctrine consequently makes it
easier for historians to quote from the work of those who have had the op-
portunity to choose to publish.
Moreover, the form of many materials mandates that they remain legally
"unpublished." Letters tend to be published as a collection only when suffi-
cient public interest in their author has been generated-ironically, often by
biographies. Hence, little-known persons with fantastic letter collections,
which could be fodder for a biography that would elevate the person to
fame, will remain undiscovered. Even if a letter collection is published, the
entire corpus of letters rarely will be.16s Who would "publish" the 36,000
documents that comprise the Oliver Wendell Holmes papers?166 Who
would read books filled only with authors' annotations in books, grocery
lists, telephone scribblings, memoranda, and signed Hallmark cards?167 As
these examples show, "unpublished" status is often not the result of autho-
rial intent.
Second, determining whether a deceased author would have wanted to
publish while alive is an equally uncertain task. When an author dies, the
copyright often passes to the family or executors.168 Without their con-
sent-either to use unpublished materials in a biography or to publish
them-the materials will never be used. Although copyright law treats the
(George Eliot), and Arnatine Lucille Aurore Dupin Dudevant (George Sand). See VIRGINIA
WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 50 (1957).
162. The number of biographies about persons of color has increased dramatically in recent
years.
163. Class status raises problems similar to those of gender and race. Virginia Woolf wrote of
the Elizabethan middle-class woman: "She never writes her own life and scarcely keeps a diary;
there are only a handful of her letters in existence. She left no plays or poems by which we canjudge
her." V. WOOLF, supra note 161, at 46.
164. C. HEILBRUN, supra note 161, at 125.
165. Existing collections of unpublished letters are often enormous. Over 70,000 letters sur-
vive relating to Lord Alfred Tennyson. See Stephen Canham, Interview-Review: Robert B. Martin, 2
BIOGRAPHY 74, 75 (1982). Eight thousand letters of Leonard Woolf's survive. See Leon Edel, So
Much More Than Virginia's Husband, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 7, col. 1
(reviewing LE"ITERS OF LEONARD WOOLF (F. Spotts ed. 1989)); see also R. ALTICK, supra note I, at
311 n.5 (noting that Lewis Carroll's "Register of Correspondence" records 98,721 letters received or
written from 1861 to 1898). Diaries are also rarely published in complete form. See J. GARRATY,
supra note 19, at 193. Women's diaries have had even less of an opportunity to be published than
have men's. See PRIVATE PAGES: DIARIES OF AMERICAN WOMEN, 18305-19705, at xiv (p. Franklin
ed. 1986).
166. See SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES xvi (1989).
167. Such items, however, do have an audience. Annotations, for example, can greatly in-
crease the value of a book on the rare book market. Interview with David Warrington, Assistant
Librarian for Special Collections, Harvard Law Library, in Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 23, 1990).
168. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(I) (1988) ("The ownership of a copyright •.• may be bequeathed by
will or pass as personal property by the appropriate laws of intestate succession"). I use "family and
executors" loosely here. The copyright can be left to various entities.
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decision of heirs as a proxy for authorial intent, these heirs often may have
other motivations. The family may bar publication because it seeks privacy
for itself or desires to preserve a particular image of the author. 169 Family
members may care more about monetary gain than the author would have,
and hence refuse to publish until a high enough price can be assured. 170 The
heirs may have neither the time nor the interest to publish. Even if the heirs
allow publication of the author's writing, it does not necessarily follow that
their decision is that of the author's. Because of good intentions, hope of
monetary gain, or public demand, the heirs may publish material in a forum
the author might have disliked or even detested. l7l As one reviewer wrote
about the publication of the unpublished and unfinished poems of Philip
Larkin:
Had Larkin lived longer, there would eventually have had to be one
more slim volume, even if slimmer than slim. But that any of the earlier
suppressed poems would have gone into it seems very unlikely. The better
they are, the better must have been his reasons for holding them back. Ad-
mittedly, the fact that he did not destroy them is some evidence that he was
not averse to their being published after his death. As a seasoned cam-
paigner for the preservation of British holograph manuscripts ... he obvi-
ously thought that his own archive should be kept safe. But the question of
how the suppressed poems should be published has now been answered:
some other way than this. 172
Even where the author appears to indicate, either in a will or other state-
ment, her or his intention regarding publication, such statements may not
guarantee later compliance. Many authors have requested that their unpub-
lished work be destroyed or censored upon their death; few of these requests
have been honored. 173 The refusal to follow such instructions reveals that
169. For instance, Alice James kept a diary that she had wanted published. After her death,
Katherine Loring had copies privately printed in 1894 for herself and James's brothers, William and
Henry. Fearing the names and descriptions in the diary, Henry James wanted the diary to remain
unpublished or published only in an edited form, after which he would burn the original. An edited
version, with initials substituted for full names, eventually was published in 1934. Only in 1964 did
the entire diary appear as Alice James had hoped. See JEAN STROUSE, ALICE JAMES: A BIOGRA-
PHY 319-26 (1980).
170. See, e.g., To Auction the Mahatma's Letters Is Not the Gandhian Way, N.Y. Times, Dec.
1, 1989, at A34, col. 3 (letter from the granddaughter of Mahatma Gandhi, suggesting that her
cousin's attempt to auction Gandhi's letters would betray his intentions). Or they may prefer to try
their own hand at biography. See John Lewis Gaddis, Dean Rusk's Personal Truce, N.Y. Times,
July 1, 1990, § 7 (Book Review), at 3, col. 1 (noting "[p]rofessional historians generally frown on
efforts by the offspring of the famous to undertake biographical projects . . . the temptations of
fileopietism too often overshadow the advantages of access and familiarity").
171. Bernard Malamud's executors decided to publish his unpublished stories, although they
confronted the question of "[b]ow will the author's reputation withstand the examination of work
never finished?" Bette Pesetsky, Schlemiel of the Golden West, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § 7
(Book Review), at 7, col. 1.
172. Clive James, Somewhere Becoming Rain, NEW YORKER, July 17, 1989, at 88,90 (review-
ing PHILIP LARKIN, CoLLECTED POEMS (A. Thwaite ed. 1988».
173. H.L. Mencken bequeathed his diary to the Enoch Pratt Free Library. In a separate mem-
orandum to his executors he wrote:
This diary is to be deposited by my Executors on the understanding that it is not to be
put at the disposal of readers until twenty-five years after my death, and is then to be open
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authorial intent has often been interpreted in a loose manner with ample
consideration given to contemporary circumstances. As Samuel Beckett's
biographer noted, "Beckett says 'Destroy my letter,' the way other people
say, 'Have a nice day.' They should know he doesn't always mean it."174
Max Brod's experience with Franz Kafka demonstrates a similar twist on
interpreting authorial intent. Brod wrote that, while alive, Kafka never
wanted to publish his manuscripts;175 nevertheless, he was pleased by each
book's eventual publication. At death, Kafka left a note asking Brod to
"bumO unread" all of his diaries, manuscripts, letters, and sketches, as well
as those held by others. Brod notes he had previously joked to Kafka that he
could not do such a thing: "Kafka's unpublished work contains the most
wonderful treasures ...." Assuming that Kafka's final request deserved as
much credence as his prior ones, Brod did not bum the papers or the manu-
script of The Trial.
Even the burning or the destruction of some papersI76 does not necessar-
ily reveal an authorial intent not to publish others. The writer usually can
only destroy letters that she or he receives.177 Charles Dickens's fire of 1860
only to students engaged in critical or historical investigation, approved after proper in-
quiry by the Chief Librarian.
70 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 213, 214 (1985). The Maryland Attorney General found that the library
could publish an edited version because the memorandum was not legally enforceable. See id. at
216-17.
W.H. Auden's request to his friends to bum his letters has been ignored. See L. EDEL, supra
note 10, at 22. T.S. Eliot and George Orwell "stipulated that no biography be written of them, at
least with any help from their widows." R. ELLMANN, supra note 10, at 1 (1973); see also Leon
Edel, The Figure Under the Carpet, in TELLING LIVES, supra note 125, at 16, 21. Willa Cather and
Ernest Hemingway established injunctions against letter publication. R. ALTICK, supra note 1, at
308. In any case, authorization can be unclear. For example, Sir Richard Burton's wife claimed that
his ghost had appeared to her and commanded the burning of his papers. See Anthony Burgess,
Living for Sex and Danger, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1990, § 7 (Book Review), at 1, 26, col. 3.
Many families have shared information and donated letters without access restrictions. See R.
ALTICK, supra note 1, at 309-10.
174. James, supra note 59, at C13, col. 1, C16, col. 5.
175. Max Brod, Postscript, in FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 326-35 (Modem Library ed. 1956)
(quoted in LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD 1-5
(y/. Bishin & C. Stone eds. 1972».
176. Burning letters has been a favorite occupation. Burners include Robert Browning,
Charles Dickens, Henry James, Thomas Hardy, Benjamin Jowett, Cassandra Austen, and Hallam
Tennyson. See R. ALTICK, supra note 1, at 160-63.
Archivists fear the smell of burnt letters. Their hesitation to advocate legally required liberal
access policies reflects their belief that such policies may lead people to bum documents. For a
discussion of archival donations and access policies, see GARY M. PETERSON & TRUDY HUSKAMP
PETERSON, ARCHIVES & MANUSCRIPTS: LAW 24-61 (1985). See also Interview with Rodney Den-
nis, Curator of Manuscripts, Harvard College Library, in Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 2, 1989); Inter-
views with Gerald Ham, State Archivist, Michael Stevens, Assistant State Archivist, and Barbara
Kaiser, Head of Collection Development, Wisconsin State Historical Society, in Madison, Wis.
(Aug. 14, 1989).
The Supreme Court's holding in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), suggests that
burning may be the best form of destruction. At least for fourth amendment purposes, people do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage. Chester A. Arthur played it safe: He put his
letters in garbage cans and then burned them. See Geoffrey Ward, FDR and the First Presidential
Library, SMITHSONIAN, Dec. 1989, at 58.
177. Henry James burned most of Edith Wharton's correspondence in 1902, whereas she kept
his. See Michiko Kakutani, Lettersfrom an Unlikely Literary Friendship, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990,
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is infamous: "This strange performance, shaking off the claims of friend-
ship, dead joys, secret presents, leaves Dickens alone under a stubborn spot-
light. His letters to others copiously survive; theirs have been consumed
away."178 Others have revised or selectively destroyed materials to leave the
image of themselves that they want discovered.179 Moreover, the author
may have intended to leave for discovery what she or he did not destroy.180
Most importantly, an author's decision to prevent publication or attempt
to destroy materials may have been the result of social factors. The author
may have feared public reaction to personal lifestyle or social choice re-
corded by the materials she or he destroyed. Over time, public opinion
changes; it may not be as intolerant as an author supposes, or a careful biog-
rapher may be able to control public reaction to the subject's choice. Autho-
rial intent arises out of a context and when that context changes, so should
interpretation of the intent.
Hence, although establishing an intention not to publish is complex and
ambiguous, and an author might have accepted a biographer borrowing a
few words, the legal doctrine assumes that anything "unpublished" creates
not just a presumption of intention never to publish, but the irrefutable
proof.
Effect on biography. The assumption that unpublished materials were
not intended for publication all but blocks the use of these materials without
consent of the copyright holder. 181 Biographers do not advocate extensive
quotation;182 however, under current law, they face the risk of litigation and
a finding of infringement if they paraphrase or quote "more than minimal
amounts" of expression.183 Biographer Milton Lomask advises, "You must
change more than the words-you must change their order and construc-
at C18, col. 3. He also burned the letters he received from his sister Alice, although those he sent to
her survive. See Jean Strouse, Semiprivate Lives. in STUDIES IN BIOGRAPHY (D. Aaron ed. 1978), at
113, 121. Men appear to have burnt letters from women more often than women have burned those
from men. Interview with Rodney Dennis, supra note 176.
178. Gillian Beer, The Original Performance Artist. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1988, § 7 (Book
Review), at 3, col. 2.
179. Walt Whitman is a notable example. See note 125 supra. In addition, Anne Frank re-
vised her diary, intending that it be read. See Judith Thurman, Not Even a Nice Girl, NEW YORKER,
Dec. 18, 1989, at 116, 117; see also A DAY AT A TIME: THE DIARY LITERATURE OF AMERICAN
WOMEN FROM 1764 TO THE PRESENT 3,7, 8-9 (M. Culley ed. 1985). And Theodore Roosevelt
wrote "posterity letters" "filled with distortions." J. GARRATY, supra note 19, at 180.
180. The executor of Justice Benjamin Cardozo's estate disposed of his correspondence after
Cardozo's death. Cardozo appears to have intended to leave this material, having previously de-
stroyed documents about which he was concerned. Interview with Andrew L. Kaufman, supra note
67. Tennyson's son, Hallam, burned material after he wrote the biography of his father. See
Canham, supra note 165, at 77.
181. See note 157 supra and accompanying text. For example, Salinger pursues his no publica-
tion policy to ensure his privacy while alive. Who knows whether he plans to guarantee his privacy
from the grave.
182. See L. EOEL, supra note 10, at 103 (noting "if a biographer feels strongly that he should
let his subject speak for himself, he should refrain from writing a biography and edit his letters and
papers instead").
183. New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989). It is
unclear what constitutes "more than minimal amounts"; however, no appellate court has yet to find
fair use.
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tion."184 Imagine for a moment a broader fair use privilege than that which
currently exists for unpublished materials. The biographer could take the
risk and include the quotation, hoping either that no suit will be brought or
that she or he will win in court. Many biographers preparing their books no
doubt share the initial impression held by Ian Hamilton: "Was there not a
doctrine of fair use to be invoked somewhere along the line?"185 But under
the extremely narrow fair use interpretation, the biographer has no legiti-
mate rationale to use the materials even if little likelihood of a suit ap-
pears.186 The law places the burden on the biographer to obtain consent
from the copyright holder or not use the copyrighted material. Moreover,
the biographer who uses the material, is sued, and is found to have infringed
the copyright, must delete the infringing material or be enjoined from publi-
cation. As the New Era court stated, "[t]he 'prohibitive' expense of republi-
cation after deletion of improperly included material is without more an
inevitable consequence of breach of copyright."187 Fearing these conse-
quences, publishers will hesitate to print biographies containing any poten-
tially infringing material. 188
Even the biographer who attempts to comply with the law will be frus-
trated. Under the narrow fair use interpretation, a biographer must contact
the author, executor, or heir of every item that she or he anticipates quoting
or paraphrasing.189 Copyright ownership may be unclear, making the at-
tempt to obtain consent extremely difficult, if not impossible. The subject's
papers may include correspondence in which the sender can no longer be
identified, or the sender's family has moved, died, or changed names. As a
practical matter, searching for the copyright holder will be inefficient if the
biographer intends to use only a sentence. And even if found, the copyright
holder still may withhold consent190 or condition it on family control of the
content of the biography. Abraham Lincoln caustically proposed the manu-
facturing of blank biographies for faJI!i1ies and friends, which they could "fill
up with rosy sentences full of high-sounding praise."191 Some authorized
184. M. LOMASK, supra note 14, at 140. Of course, not all biographers have perceived the law
as particularly important. One author stated, "If the biographer is fortunate enough to have a large
amount of original source material ... and this material has some literary quality, then his task is
comparatively simple. He can choose from that material the parts which will best serve his purpose
and let the man speak for himself. EDWARD H. O'NEILL, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
1800-1935, at 9 (1935).
185. I. HAMILTON, supra note 45, at 67.
186. For two excellent statements of the impact of the current doctrine on biography and
historiography, see Hearings, supra note 6 (statements of Taylor Branch and J. Anthony Lukas).
187. New Era, 873 F.2d at 584.
188. See notes 69-71 supra and accompanying text (discussing consequences of Salinger and
New Era on the publishing industry); Interview with Linda Simon, supra note 67.
189. For a fascinating story of the legal and contractual maneuvers involved in preparing a
biography, see Phillip KnightIey, T.E. Lawrence, in THE CRAFT OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY 154-72
(J. Meyers ed. 1985); see also J. CLIFFORD, supra note 126, at 26-28, 32-33.
190. Interview with Linda Simon, supra note 67.
191. J. GARRATY, supra note 19, at 103; Interview with Thomas C. Reeves, supra note 120
("authorized biography emasculates biography"). The monopolistic control over papers that au-
thorized biographies grant can endlessly delay publication of a biography. For example, Oliver
Wendell Holmes died in 1935; exclusive access to the Holmes papers was given to a long line of
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biographers possess relatively broad freedom; but, even "[f]riendly relations"
with the family create an "unspoken restraint on writing anything nasty."192
Hence, to avoid acting illegally, a biographer may have to accept the
legal assumption that every unpublished piece of material was never in-
tended by its author to be published. This decision may eliminate from biog-
raphy any inclusion of the author's voice outside of published documents, as
well as any use of the author's writing to convey an ambiguous point or
illustrate an interpretation. Biographical alternatives are somewhat unpleas-
ant: the biographer can paraphrase the material and omit the source, hoping
that no one will track down the original document and claim copyright; be-
come an authorized biographer beholden to the authorizer; or retreat into
the objectivity conundrum by stating an interpretation of an unpublished
document as fact, knowing that few readers will bother to track down the
citation and compare the unpublished source. Hence, the law promotes
either those biographies that avoid research in primary documents and deny
reliance upon them in writing, or those that erect a fagade of historical objec-
tivity. The subtle forces that initially denied certain authors the possibility
ofbeing published will remain invisible, masked by biographical quotation of
only the published voice. Moreover, biography will not encourage the
reader to embark on the complex deciphering of an author's beliefs. With-
out quotations from unpublished materials, the author's intent on numerous
issues mentioned in such materials may appear clear and uncontestable-
whatever the biographer tells the reader. The biography will not provoke
the reader to question the degree to which understandings of intent are inter-
pretation. In the end, the reader will not wonder about the motivations of
the subject, nor, more importantly, about those of the biographer.
B. Privacy
Ideas about privacy also affect the use of unpublished materials in biog-
raphy. Commentators have discussed the relation between copyright and
privacy for a century. Some have argued that copyright doctrine does or
authorized biographers-Felix Frankfurter, Mark DeWolfe Howe, and Grant Gilmore-none of
whom completed the biography. Holmes's biography finally appeared, written by Sheldon Novick, a
nonauthorized biographer, who, nonetheless, was given access to the papers. See S. NOVICK, supra
note 166, at xvi.
192. Barbara W. Tuchman, Biography as a Prism of History, in TELLING LIVES, supra note
125, at 132, 143.
Other biographers and critics have discussed the privileges and burdens of being an authorized
biographer and friend. See, e.g., Hayden Herrera, "I'm Going to Live a Different Life," N.Y. Times,
Nov. 5, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 3, col. I (biographer reviewing ROXANA ROBINSON, GEORGIA
O'KEEFE: A LIFE (1989), and criticizing author for avoiding the issue of O'Keefe's bisexuality);
John W. Aldridge, The Count ofRowan Date, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 3,
col. I (noting that FREDERICK R. KARL, WILLIAM FAULKNER: AMERICAN WRITER-A BIOGRA-
PHY (1989), did not emphasize Faulkner's affairs and drinking).
The same problems occur in editing letters. See Gerald N. Grob, Dear Dr. Karl, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 19, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 25, col. 2 (reviewing THE SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF
KARL A. MENNINGER, 1919-1948 (H. Faulkner & V. Pruitt eds. 1988), and noting that Menninger
may have played a role in the editing process).
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should address privacy concerns.193 Others have insisted that copyright law
does not encompass privacy interests. 194 Nevertheless, it seems counterin-
tuitive to discuss how biographers use unpublished documents without ex-
amining privacy issues. Even those who reject the idea that copyright law
should account for "privacy" concerns resort to "privacy" when discussing
the differences among works with "unpublished" statuS. 195
The legal background. Although privacy, broadly understood, has long
been a concern, as a legal concept, privacy did not acquire significance in the
United States until the publication of Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Bran-
deis's classic article. 196 The authors argued that a right to privacy could be
found in common law doctrines, including copyright protection for let-
ters. 197 In the years following publication of the article, a tort-based theory
of privacy aroused intense and controversial academic discussion.198 Cur-
rently, most states recognize some version of a privacy law.199 State law
193. See note 77 supra.
194. See. e.g.• Leval, supra note 19, at 1119 n.67, 1129-30.
195. Compare New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("the protection of privacy is not the function of copyright law") with id. at 1505
("in making a fair use analysis ... privacy interests may be an appropriate consideration"). In this
section, I do not discuss the many and complex types of common law privacy actions-right of
publicity, false light depiction, public disclosure of private facts, and intrusion. The article, instead,
focuses on broad generalizations about privacy that creep into copyright analysis.
196. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890). Warren and Brandeis feared the "[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise"
that had "invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life." ld. at 195. Such inventions
and methods, they argued, lowered social standards and morality. ld. at 196.
Analysts of the article have found significant the circumstances which prompted the article: the
publication of newspaper accounts of the Warrens' elaborate entertaining. Brandeis's biographer
provided this information. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect ofHuman Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 156, 159-63
(F. Schoeman ed. 1984) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY].
197. See notes 143-146 supra. According to Warren and Brandeis, the right to privacy had to
exist because copyright law could not satisfactorily explain judicial decisions that restricted the pub-
lication of the contents of letters or an "enumeration" of a series of letters. Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 196, at 201. Thus the law protected not just property, but "inviolate personality." ld. at
205. The Warren-Brandeis conception of the right to privacy, however, was limited. They extended
it only to living people, not to third persons. Their right to privacy did not extend to those who had
"renounced the right to live their lives screened from public observation." ld. at 215. Furthermore,
they emphasized that "no fixed formula be used to prohibit obnoxious publications." ld. By ac-
cepting this need for some to "lose" their right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis foreshadowed the
fundamental contradiction between free speech and privacy. See RICHARD F. HIXSON, PRIVACY lli
A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 32-33 (1987).
198. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tart, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 294 (1983) ("Is it possible that the seemingly
elegant vessel that Warren and Brandeis set afloat some nine decades ago is in fact a leaky ship
which should at long last be scuttled?"); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tart Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); William L. Prosser, Privacy. 48 CALIF.
L. REv. 383 (1960) (suggesting four distinct infringements of the right to privacy). For an excellent
selected bibliography, see PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 418-24.
For a short history and critique of the privacy theory, see R. HIXSON, supra note 197, at 1-89.
199. See COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 2 (R. Smith ed. 1988).
These laws include those concerning access to various records and computer databases, drug and
AIDS testing, wiretaps, privileges, as well as general privacy statutes or constitutional provisions.
Not all states recognize a right to privacy at common law or in statutes. See id. at 29.
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actions against biographers, however, are difficult to win.2OO Moreover, con-
stitutional law, particularly the first amendment, may limit the scope of
common law privacy protection.20I And even ifsome foundation for a right
not to speak exists, the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the
right as part of a constitutional right to privacy. Nevertheless, privacy con-
cerns influence biographers through background assumptions about the mo-
tives and intentions of the biographer, and through the incorporation of
privacy concerns into the weight given the "unpublished" statuS.202
Despite numerous discussions and cases predicated upon settling the
meaning and scope of "privacy," the term has escaped definition. Commen-
tators have debated the rights and interests, ifany,203 that it encompasses.204
Nevertheless, conventional conceptions of privacy, manifested, for example,
by "the right to be let alone," look inward.205 Alan Westin writes,
Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual to social participation, pri-
vacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the gen-
eral society through physical or psychological means, either in a state of
solitude or small-group intimacy or, when among larger groups, in a condi-
tion of anonymity or reserve.206
Similarly, Anita Allen defines privacy as "a condition of inaccessibility of the
person, his or her mental states, or information about the person to the
senses or surveillance devices of others."207 And Ruth Gavison, attempting
"to vindicate the way most of us think and talk about privacy issues," de-
scribes privacy as "a concern for limited accessibility."208 Judge Newman
follows this line of commentators by discussing a "zone of privacy" from
which the individual may "exclude the inquisitive public."209
200. See note 85 supra; see also Newman, supra note 77, at 476 (discussing preemption
problems).
201. Cf. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (narrowly holding that imposing dam-
ages on a newspaper for violation of a state "privacy" statute prohibiting publication of sexual as-
sault victims' names violated the first amendment).
202. See Dratler, supra note 44, at 284 ("[u]npublished works resound with overtones of pri-
vacy"). Privacy concerns could also justify extending protection to the use of facts from unpublished
writing. See Newman, supra note 77, at 478. Preemption and first amendment concerns, however,
could limit severely such an extension. Cf. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("We do not suggest this right not to speak would sanction abuse of the
copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts.").
203. See Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right to Privacy, in RIGHTS, REsTITuTION AND RISK:
EsSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 117-34 (W. Parent ed. 1986) (arguing that violations of privacy rights
may also be violations of other recognized rights).
204. For an excellent summary of various philosophical perspectives on privacy, see Ferdinand
Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions ofthe Literature, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 1-33; see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WO-
MEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 1-53 (1988).
205. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 93, § 15-1, at 1303.
206. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
207. A. ALLEN, supra note 204, at 15.
208. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 346, 346-47.
209. Newman, supra note 77, at 465. Paul Weiss offers a somewhat more complex analysis,
concluding that "privacy" is that element which makes distinctive, complex, recognizable persons.
See PAUL WEISS, PRIVACY (1983).
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As applied, this privacy zone or inaccessible space has tended to be
equated with the realm of home, family, and intimates.210 In addition, as
state law privacy actions have shown, the right of privacy under this vision
"terminates upon death."211 People can claim their own rights, but not
those of others.212 Hence, privacy is "a personal right that ... [can] only be
invoked by and expired with the individual."213
The legal assumption. This individualistic understanding of privacy as-
sumes that an "individual" can be conceived of as distinct from the "soci-
ety" in which she or he lives.214 In other words, it perceives of people as
egocentric creatures, possessing identities outside of and distinct from soci-
ety. The boundaries of their respective identities only extend to the living
physical body and the home. Thus, privacy arises, not from relationships
among people, but from the absence of such relationships. Accepting such a
presocial conception of the individual, the law enshrines a privacy right
designed to ensure isolation.
Questioning the validity ofthe assumption. The idea of privacy as an indi-
vidual- and zone-centered concept has been challenged on two fronts. One
group of critics has denied that any "private" area exists apart from the
"public" or society as a whole. The very idea of "privacy," they assert, may
be the contrived product of a patriarchal society. Catharine MacIGnnon
writes,
"Private" means "inside the family." "Public" means the rest of the world.
That is, the family is considered to be a truly private space, private for eve-
ryone in it. . . . To consider the home "private" is to privatize women's
oppression and to render women's status a question of domestic relations to
be analyzed as a derivative of the public sphere ....215
Other scholars echo the belief that by calling certain aspects of life "private,"
they disappear from public and political consideration. Elizabeth Schneider,
for example, writes that the phrase "the personal is political" reflects the
210. See P. WEISS, supra note 209, at xii; Newman, supra note 77, at 465; Elizabeth M. Schnei-
der, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement. 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 589, 626 (1986). One commentator explains that the common law privacy tort "posits a legal
power to control the flow of information about one's self to other people." Zimmerman, supra note
198, at 293. She criticizes the tort for overlooking "the fact that genuine social values are served by
encouraging a free exchange of personal information." Id. at 294.
211. Newman, supra note 77, at 475 (suggesting allowing an extremely limited time after death
before termination to locate the executor and publisher); see New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry
Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 n.4 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, J., concurring).
212. Savell, supra note 85, at 11; see Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc.
2d 1, 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d. 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (stating that the right to privacy is "a purely personal
one which may be enforced only by the party himself"); Fasching v. Kallinger, 211 N.J. Super. 26,
39-40, 510 A.2d 694, 701-02 (App. Div. 1986) (rejecting relational right of privacy).
213. Savell, supra note 85, at 10 n.43.
214. The law has accepted this assumption even when denying privacy claims. For example,
the Court wrote, "Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a
civilized society." Time, Inc. v. HilI, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
215. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A THEORY OF A FEMINIST STATE 35 (1989);
see also C. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue. in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 107, at 146, 155
(arguing that so-called privacy rights basically amount to the rights of men to "inflict pornography
upon women in private").
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view that "the realm of personal experience, the 'private' which has always
been trivialized, particularly for women, is an appropriate and important
subject of public inquiry, and that the 'private' and 'public' worlds are inex-
tricably linked."216 According to these theories, the concept of "privacy"
possesses little intrinsic meaning. Nonetheless, it tyrannizes society by em-
ploying legal rubrics (e.g., the ubiquitous state action doctrine) to refuse to
alter or even examine our perceptions and practices in so-called "private"
areas.
The second group of critics, in contrast, are unwilling to abandon con-
ceptions of "privacy." They have sought to reformulate "privacy" within
different conceptions of "self" and "society." They perceive as impossible
the establishment of a universal "person" or "private." A "person" may be
"something like a corporation of context-dependent characters";217 alterna-
tively, a "person" may be "fundamentally oriented toward and dependent on
other people."218 One author, responding to an individual-centered concep-
tion of privacy, writes:
This self-perception in terms of one's own isolation, of the invisible wall
dividing one's own "inner" self from all the people and things "outside"
takes on for a large number of people in the course of the modem age the
same immediate force of conviction that the movement of the sun around an
earth situated at the center of the cosmos possessed in the Middle Ages.
Like the geocentric picture of the physical universe earlier, the egocentric
image of the social universe is certainly capable of being conquered by a
more realistic, if emotionally less appealing picture.219
This relationship-based notion of privacy also incorporates those under-
standings which acknowledge that, for many, "family" is not limited to the
living. Intangible bonds or obligations that particular family members or
friends feel toward the dead, or toward the reputation of the dead, may com-
prise a part of the personhood or self of those individual family members or
friends.220
216. Schneider, supra note 210, at 602. Experiences such as sexual harassment, battery of
women, and child abuse, formerly considered "private" experiences, are now considered worthy of
public concern. See id. at 624-26, 643 (sexual harassment specifically); see also Lesbians, Gays and
Feminists at the Bar: Translating Personal Experience into Effective Legal Argument-A Symposium,
10 WOMENS' RTS. L. REp. 107, 114-16 (1988) (recalIing that battery used to be "gossip"). But see
A. ALLEN, supra note 204, at 54-81 (arguing that women should attempt to obtain additional and
more meaningful privacy).
217. Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 403, 409; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Per-
sonhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 962-65 (1982).
218. NORBERT ELIAS, THE HISTORY OF MANNERS 261 (E. Jephcott trans. 1978); see also id.
at 248-49 (suggesting that the vision of an isolated self reflects a particular stage of cultural
development).
219. It!. at 260.
220. See Radin, supra note 217, at 963-64; see also Partridge, supra note 85 (arguing that a
moral personality exists which "transcend[s] the time and place of its own biological life span," id. at
254, and that the living respect this personality in order to assure themselves the continuation of this
moral community, id. at 261). Some religions also teach that the person does not die with the body
but continues to exist in an altered form.
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Privacy, then, is not pre-political, but rather "created and bestowed" by
society.221 Consequently, private spaces differ across different societies and
cultures.222 For example, the upperclass Athenian woman imprisoned in
her house may have suffered the "loneliness of no privacy, and no freely
chosen friends."223 The ancient Hebrews perceived sexual behavior as sub-
ject to the concerns of God and the community.224 Privacy, if a "panhuman
trait," has been circumscribed and defined by societies.
Privacy, in this view, becomes "regard for another's fragile, mysterious
autonomy."22S It protects self-determination, rather than simply offering a
"mere right to be let alone."226 Envisioning privacy this way suggests that a
right to privacy requires not isolation, but respect for personhood.227 Pri-
vacy can be maintained despite revelations about an individual if the receiver
seeks to understand that the information matters deeply to that individ-
ua1.228 Privacy requires an attitude towards the person that recognizes that
person's essential humanity.229
Effect on biography. The legal assumption that privacy involves inacces-
sibility or a separation of self from society sneaks into fair use analysis, ad-
ding weight to judges' and even biographers' decisions that some material
221. R. HIXSON, supra note 197, at xiv; see also id. at 90-132 (emphasizing a community-based
theory of privacy over one based on an individual inherent right); BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRI-
VACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 74-76, 274-80 (1984) (surveying understand-
ings of privacy in different societies, including nonliterate, ancient Hebrew, and Greek cultures); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 805 (1989) ("right to privacy exists be-
cause democracy must impose limits on the extent of control and direction that the state exercises
over the day-to-day conduct of individual lives").
222. See B. MOORE, supra note 221.
223. Id. at 166.
224. See id. at 206-16.
225. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Idealsfrom Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 432 (1987).
226. Rhonda Cope10n, Unpacking Patriarchy: Reproduction. Sexuality, Originalism and Con-
stitutional Change, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 303, 318-19 (J. Lobel ed. 1988).
227. See L. TRIBE, supra note 93, §§ 15-2 to -4, at 1304-14. Tribe advocates a "personhood"
approach to constitutional privacy law:
the conviction that, even though one's identity is constantly and profoundly shaped by the
rewards and penalties, the exhortations and scarcities and constraints of one's social envi-
ronment, the "personhood" resulting from this process in sufficiently "one's own" to be
deemed fundamental in conformation with the one entity that retains a monopoly over
legitimate violence-the government.
Id. § 15-2, at 1305-06; see also A. ALLEN, supra note 204, at 43-48 (discussing "personhood" ac-
counts of privacy, noting that "[t]o give a complete account of privacy's moral value, it is necessary
to consider the social character of human existence," id. at 48).
228. Others have argued that privacy relates to personhood, see Jeffrey H. Reiman, Pri~'acy,
Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 300,
310-14; to the ability to enter relationships, see Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 265; James Rachels, Why Privacy is Impor-
tant, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 290, 292-97; and to the
respect accorded others, see Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 223; Charles Fried, Privacy, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 196, at 203. Some of these authors would argue that
certain absolute rights of privacy are necessary to assure respect.
229. Schoeman, supra note 217, at 406-09.
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falls far outside the ambit of fair use.230 Judge Leval wrote, "If the protected
document is highly personal, private and intimate ... if the public interest in
the content is minimal and voyeuristic at best . . . , those might well be
factors disfavoring a finding of fair use."231 And even before a judge faces
the decision, a biographer, aware ofjudicial and general public acceptance of
an inaccessibility entitlement inherent in privacy, may refrain from including
borderline material. Moreover, the narrow fair use defense for unpublished
materials places in the hands of the copyright holder the power to deny per-
mission to a biographer based on these privacy concerns.
Biography at times seems to revolve around the question "[b]ow much
should a biographer telI?"232 James Clifford writes, "It is all very well to
describe a man's bad temper, or his silly foibles, or to point out that occa-
sionally he drank too much, but what about secret love affairs, illegitimate
children, or the subject's syphiliS?"233 Or consider a biographer's choice
whether to omit, mention, or discuss a lesbian or homosexual relationship.
A reviewer of Elizabeth Bishop's biography remarked that the book "is not
without its hagiographic aspects.... [M]ore strangely, [Bishop's] lesbianism
is ... played down. Quite apart from questions of prudery, it is hard to
believe that Bishop's sexuality has no relation to her poetry."234 Should a
biographer include material which suggests that the subject held anti-Semitic
or racist views, and, if she or he does, what conclusions should the biogra-
pher draw? The controversy over H.L. Mencken's diary raised this issue.
Some believe that the passages revealed reprehensible personal opinions.235
Others feel that such views represented broader cultural currents for which
individuals should not wholeheartedly be condemned.236 Finally, should a
biographer of a male subject reveal every woman with whom the subject was
ever involved?237 The biographer's answer to these questions determines the
230. The recent development of the narrow fair use privilege for unpublished materials does
not permit me to elucidate numerous cases in which judges have considered privacy concerns under
the rubric of fair use. The effect of the legal privacy assumption, therefore, is somewhat hypotheti-
cal. I base my analysis on the premise that the law will strengthen current social prohibitions on
biographers' freedom to shape their depiction of the subject.
231. New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1505 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
232. J. CLIFFORD, supra note 126, at 120.
233. Id.; see also id. at 113-33.
234. See Katha Pollitt, Her Friends Were Everything, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, § 7 (Book
Review), at 3, col. 3 (reviewing DAVID KALSIONE, BECOMING A POET: ELIZABETH BISHOP WITH
MARIANNE MOORE AND ROBERT LoWELL (R. Hemenway ed. 1989».
235. Sheldon L. Richman, Mr. Mencken and the Jews, 59 AM. SCHOLAR 407, 408 (1990) (re-
butting "damning" charges that Mencken was an anti-Semite).
236. Russell Baker, Prejudices Without the Mask, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at A31, col. 1
("[i]n that setting, southwest Baltimore in the 1930's and 1940's, we were all racists and anti-
Semites, and much more that now seems just as unsavory"); see Gwinn Owens, Mencken-Getting a
Bum Rap?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at A31, cols. 2-5 (arguing that "today's readers are unaware
how commonplace racial slurs and stereotypes were in the 20's and 30's"); see also Richard Bern-
stein, After Death, a Writer Is Accused ofAnti-Semitism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1989, at C17, cols. 1-2
(discussing Brendan Gill's accusation that Joseph Campbell was an anti-Semite).
237. Elizabeth Longford included the names of the 38 of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt's lovers. See
Elizabeth Longford, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, in THE CRAFT OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY, supra note
189, at 55, 64. Longford withheld the names of married women with children, but she was more
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way in which the reader will view history. The constraint placed on the
biographer by the law's limiting vision of privacy suggests that she or he will
play it safe. Secret love affairs, lesbian relationships, alcoholism, racism,
when revealed only through unpublished documents, may as well have never
occurred or existed.238
The legal individualist assumption of privacy appears to give some defer-
ence to the expressed intent of the subject. That is, if a subject implies some
aspect of her or his life was "private," judges and biographers should agree.
Such a construction, however, might sweep wide enough as to preclude any
author who had ever indicated a dislike of biography regardless of possible
qualifications. Moreover, a subject's expressed intention could be privileged
despite cultural and social changes undercutting the rationale for the sub-
ject's concern. For example, Mrs. Gaskell omitted from her biography of
Charlotte Bronte, the novelist's "hopeless infatuation" with Constantin He-
ger out of concern for Bronte's husband, and in deference to "the Victorian
notions of propriety which would not allow even an unconscious attraction
between a young single woman and her married schoolmaster."239 Or the
law may ignore the complex motivations of subjects such as Beckett:
More than this, [Beckett] saw besmirchment as the human condition. What
right had he to except himself from it? Might not his claim to privacy be the
last rag of egotism? After all; he himself once printed in a story some
sentences from a woman's letter to him, and having violated another's pri-
vacy he could scarcely be hoity-toity about his own.240
Furthermore, the individualist, inward-looking assumption may operate to
bar biographies of persons, particularly women, because society has tradi-
tionally considered their lives "private."24I To write of "the wives, daugh-
ters, sisters, mothers and lovers of people who did do things that made them
famous" is difficult, for "their lives were private; their achievements-chil-
concerned with the effect the list would have on Blount's poetical reputation than with the effect on
the women or children.
238. Some writers' disdain for biography, especially biography in which they are the subject, is
legendary. Oscar Wilde said, "'Every great man has his disciples ... and it is usually Judas who
writes the biography.''' R. ELLMANN, supra note 10, at 1. Wilde also noted that" 'biography adds
to death a new terror.''' R. ELLMANN, Freud and Literary Biography, in A LONG THE RlVERRUN,
supra note 124, at 259. Thomas Carlyle believed that" 'the biographies of men ofletters are for the
most part the saddest chapter in the history of the human race except Newgate Calendar.''' Id. at
259-60. And George Eliot called biography "a disease of English literature." Edel, supra note 173,
at 21. Hypocrisy in this area, however, is also legendary. For example, Auden disliked biography
except when the subject was "absolutely fascinating." Henry James detested the idea of a biography
about himself but read and wrote many others. See Marc Pachter, The Biographer Himself: An
Introduction, in TELLING LIVES, supra note 125, at 3, 7.
239. Katherine Frank, The Bronte'Biographers: Romance, Reality, and Revision, 2 BIOGRAPHY
141, 143 (1979) (discussing MRS. GASKELL, LIFE OF CHARLOITE BRONTE (1857». Bronte's feel-
ings were known in 1913 when the letters were published.
240. R. ELLMANN, The Life ofSim Botchit, in A LONG THE RlVERRUN, supra note 124, at 229,
231.
241. Cf. Manganyi, supra note 18, at 52 (discussing possibility ofa history of writing of victims
of apartheid); Stephen w. Sears, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, § 7 (Book Review), at 8, col. 1 (review-
ing JOSEPH T. GLATfHAER, FORGED IN BATfLE: THE CIVIL WAR ALLIANCE OF BLACK SOLDIERS
AND WHITE OFFICERS (1989».
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dren, good homes, ripe peaches, warm quilts-were not the stuff of his-
tory."242 After finding in "formerly neglected sources"243 unpublished
materials by the semiprivate, the unknown, obscure, and disenfranchised,
the biographer must decide whether to use them. Quoting the material may
be risky. A court, applying fair use analysis and an inward-looking idea of
privacy, may not perceive that judging these quotations "private" and pro-
hibited by copyright creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. Until such lines ap-
pear in public "history," the law's categorization will continue to find them
"private."
Beyond restricting the biographer's choice of subjects and their proclivi-
ties, the legal conception of privacy also affects the biographer's access to
materials.244 The family and friends of a subject, citing traditional access-
based privacy notions, can refuse to give access to material in their own
holdings245 or in library collections.246 Joyce destroyed letters between Sa-
242. Strouse, supra note 177, at 114, 118-19. See Deborah Kaplan, The Disappearance of the
Woman Writer: Jane Austen and Her Biographers. 7 PROSE STUD. 129, 145 (1984):
By considering both her public and her private writings, we can consider the relations
between general and woman's culture.•.. Patriarchy has dominated Anglo-American cul-
ture and hence its biographies, but that hegemony is now under attack.... We can chal-
lenge biography's patriarchal reconstructions of the past with the histories of women
writers like Jane Austen.
243. Lerner, supra note 117, at 109.
244. For a discussion of whether there is a "right to biography," see LOIS G. FORER, A CHIL-
LING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE
FIRSf AMENDMENT 208-34 (1987) (asking "To Whom Does a Life Belong?").
245. See C.D. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 64 (noting biographers were barred access to family
papers including those of Bernard DeVoto and Mark Twain); J. GARRATY, supra note 19, at 170-72.
Of course, not all families have the same "philosophy of privacy." Ann Hulbert, Washington Dia-
rist-Keep Out. NEW REpUBLIC, Nov. 14, 1988. Hulbert contrasts Stephen Joyce's destruction of
his letters from James Joyce's daughter, Lucia, and Benjamin Cheever's statement in the introduc-
tion to The Letters ofJohn Cheever "that for my father, orgasm was always accompanied by a vision
of sunshine, or flowers." Id.; cf Phyllis Auty, Problems of Writing a Biography of a Communist
Leader in NEW DIRECTIONS IN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 18, at 26-40 (discussing the problem faced
by biographers writing on communist leaders when the party limits access to perpetuate a particular
image of the leader).
246. Biographers usually gain access to materials at libraries only after signing contractual
agreements, often restricting their ability to cite original materials. Such restrictions mirror legal
requirements, requiring permission of the copyright holder. For example, the application to examine
manuscripts in Houghton Library at Harvard University states that examination
does not include permission to publish the contents of the manuscript or any excerpt there-
from ... and that separate written application for permission to publish in any form, or to
quote in a dissertation, must be made to the librarian. . .. I agree to abide by his decision.
The library makes no representation that it is the owner of the common law copyright or
literary property in any unpublished manuscript, and that permission to publish must also
be obtained from the owner of the copyright (the author or his transferees, heirs, legatees,
or literary executors.
A typical letter to a biographer states,
In so far, and only in so far, as the rights of this library extend, I am glad to give you
permission to quote from •.. [the letters] in the manner outlined .... The library can only
claim physical ownership of the manuscript in question, and it is impossible for us to deter-
mine the identity of possible claimants of literary property. Responsibility for identifying
and satisfying any such claimants must be assumed by users wishing to publish the
material.
Interview with Rodney Dennis, supra note 176. See G. PETERSON & T.H. PETERSON, supra note
176, at 38-40, 42, 53-55.
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muel Beckett and Lucia, stating that "no one was going to set their eyes on
them and psychoanalyze my poor aunt."247 Or they may grant access, but
subject to their approval of the final product. For example, Stephen Joyce
"obtained the deletion of an epilogue by threatening to withhold permission
to quote from other material throughout the book, such as 'a perfectly in-
nocuous' letter from James Joyce to his patron, Harriet Shaw Weaver."248
These fair use-based methods of protecting privacy probably will be more
successful than state common law or statutory privacy actions.249 And if the
family can get to court, privacy concerns may motivate a judge in a copy-
right case to defer to the plaintiff'. With certain individuals, privacy con-
cerns may simply make writing some biographies, or aspects of them, quite
risky.250
To avoid potential litigation, the biographer will explore only a subject's
traditional public life-the commonly accepted area of accessibility. Ventur-
ing into aspects which the law assumes are "private" will be too difficult.
The biographer cannot quote any material from the "private" to support a
complex or contested interpretation. Moreover, without quotation as a "fac-
tual" basis, a biographer's conclusions concerning activities the law consid-
ers "private" will appear frivolous, unscholarly, and idle speculation.
Biography whose subjects lived in the distant past will focus on men, mostly
white; biography whose subjects lived in the recent past, will tell little of the
subjects' life and relationships that might bear on friends and family that
remain alive. Perhaps most significantly, biography will reinforce the legal
conception of humans as individuals whose actions in the private sphere can
be isolated and should be ignored.
III. THE LITERARY THEORY OF BIOGRAPHY
I have explained that copyright and privacy doctrine, although aimed at
the seemingly narrow issue of how and under what circumstances one can
use unpublished documents, encourages a specific form of biography. Shar-
ing the assumptions encoded in the relevant law, biographies suggest to their
readers that "facts" possess objective truth, that an author's intent is easily
247. James, supra note 59, at C13, C16, col. l.
248. ld. at 16, col. 5.
249. The Rosenbergs' children brought a privacy action in Meeropol v. Nizer, 361 F. Supp.
1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), dismissed, 417 F. Supp. 1205 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). State law privacy actions also failed in Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc.
2d 1,294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (holding that a public figure has no right under New York
privacy statute to suppress truthful accounts oflife), and in Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath,
188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783, (Sup. Ct. 1947) ("The right of privacy statute does not apply to
an unauthorized biography of a public figure unless the biography is fictional or novelized in charac-
ter . . .. That it may contain untrue statements does not transform it into a class of fiction.")
Occasionally, privacy actions succeed. See P.N. AcrON, supra note 85 (discussion of successful
privacy action against author by living subject).
250. Before confronting legal problems, Hamilton had decided to write only of Salinger's life
before he secluded himself-in other words, the time during which he arguably was a public figure:
"J.D. Salinger was now a public figure. Not very public yet, but public enough for him to be talked
about by a lot of people he had never met, to have an identity in many others' mind that was outside
his immediate control." I. HAMILTON, supra note 45, at 111.
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discernable and highly relevant, and that privacy not only exists as an ascer-
tainable concept, but looks inward, concerning itself with individual inacces-
sibility. Some may be satisfied with this type of biography. But should we
be? The stories we tell about ourselves promote certain visions. If we want
to imagine a world of different possibilities, the way in which we describe
ourselves may be a good place to begin.251 Perhaps the current legal as-
sumptions exclude too much. Others would let us tell different stories. If I
believed, as some critics do, that we could constantly revise these assump-
tions, a moment's decision to create legal doctrine as it currently exists
would not bar future change.252 But I fear that the law, by recreating a
biography in its own image, silences a crucial area of human self-exploration.
Yeats predicted, "We may come to think that nothing exists but a stream of
souls, that all knowledge is biography."253 The law may dam our under-
standings in a manmade mud hole.
The causal relation between law and biography may be as much circular
as one-way. The evolution of legal choices in the areas of copyright and
privacy law was no doubt affected by traditional canons of biographical
craft-canons which sought to reveal objective truth in history, believed that
the intent of a subject was easily discerned, and, perhaps, limited inquiry to
certain "respectable" questions.254 The stories such biographers tell have
had, and should continue to have, a part in defining our historical conscious-
ness. Indeed, traditional biographies strive to describe the diversity of
human experience.255
But the variety of current biographies does not contradict my earlier con-
tention that traditional biographies, as a genre, lack the capacity to provoke
the reader to reconsider our understanding of history, culture, and society.
The legal assumptions discussed above seep into biography in subtle ways-
and randomly pulling a biography off the shelf may fail to convince anyone
of the need for legal change.
Hence I describe a normative theory of biography.256 Quite frankly, it
would be frustrating, if not, perhaps, quite unpleasant, to read a biography
fulfilling every characteristic of normative biography, even assuming that an
author would write one. I nevertheless use the idea of normative biography
to sketch a model: a super self-conscious, continually self-checking, criti-
cally self-analytic biography that forces the reader to proceed in a conscious,
251. See Gordon, supra note 66.
252. Cj. ROBERTO MANGEBEIRA UNGER, THE CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(1983).
253. L. EDEL, supra note 10, at 20 (quoting W.B. Yeats).
254. See text accompanying note 239 supra (discussing biographer Mrs. Gaskell's omission of
Charlotte Bronte's infatuation because of Victorian morality).
255. See. e.g., R. GITTINGS, supra note 7, at 92-93 ("we seem to have arrived at a notable point
when present life itselfis enlarged and enriched by what we read about past lives"); P. M. KENDALL,
supra note 7, at 126.
256. My idea of normative biography is one of imagined types. Recall Michelangelo's
"slaves"-nudes emerging from marble blocks. The blocks with their partially carved rockladen
figures represent traditional biography, but the vision we form in our minds of the bodies unencum-
bered by marble, parallels normative biography.
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critical fashion. Such a biography would promote a reflective impulse and
creates space for society to reconsider its beliefs about itself. Legal doctrines
that hinder the normative biography necessarily hinder less provocative vi-
sions. Our task is to recreate our legal understandings to facilitate the
"knowledge of how other people have given shape to their lives, knowledge
of other ages and cultures, knowledge of the conditions of freedom and fate
"257
In this section, I first sketch the idea of normative biography by recog-
nizing four essential problems of biography. I then discuss how normative
biography, like traditional biography, is imperiled by law. In the final sec-
tion, I analyze three possible legal changes in a search to find a legal under-
standing that not only will permit, but also will encourage, normative
biography.
A. Normative Biography
Normative biography derives from criticism of traditional biography.
Biography, until recently, received little theoretical attention compared to
other forms of writing.258 Recent critics, practitioners, and literary theo-
rists, however, have debated issues such as the precise division between
"fact" and interpretation, the degree to which the biographer should appear
in the work, the extent to which psychoanalysis provides a useful analytical
tool, the amount of freedom the biographer should have over the arrange-
ment and selection of materials, and the boundary delineating insight from
trivial gossip.259 Few critics desire definite resolution; their quarrels involve
degrees and distinctions. Structuring their perceptions of the boundaries of
the debate are what biographical theorist William Epstein calls "generic
frames"-understandings of biography that appear to shape our recognition
that a piece of writing is "biography."260 Epstein suggests four "frames,"
essentially four problems confronted by biographers: "recognizing the life-
text" (the problem of depicting life from written text); "recognizing the bio-
graphical subject" (the problem that a biographer's choice of subject neces-
sarily constructs the biography); "recognizing the biographer" (the problem
of biography as the art of interpretation); and, "recognizing the life-course"
(the problem of addressing traditional cultural and societal assumptions and
conventions of the self).261 I employ these four frames to describe a norma-
tive biography. Each frame reminds us that biography is not merely a book;
257. James F. Veninga, Biography: The Self and the Sacred Canopy, in THE BIOGRAPHER'S
GIFT, supra note 18, at 59, 68.
258. Biographical theorists often begin their discussions with this observation. See, e.g., W.
EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 1, 6-11. Commentary on biography tends to fall into four categories:
history of biography, how-to-do-biography, personal experience about writing biography, and liter-
ary theories. Most writers combine at least two of these categories.
259. See generally D. NOVARR, supra note 11 (summarizing theories by a number ofbiogra-
phers and critics).
260. For Epstein's own complex definition of generic frames, see W. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at
2-3.
261. ld. at 3. My apologies to William Epstein for reducing his complex literary theory and
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it is a process. Biography involves a subject who thinks and then writes, a
biographer who reads and then writes, and a reader who reads and then
must think.
1. Recognizing the life-text.
"Life-text" describes the problem biographers face in, first, constructing
a life out of written materials and then recording the construction through
written materials. Essentially the problem involves the idea of "fact."
"Fact" may have no "special claim to the truth other than that granted to it
by biographical recognition."262 In normative biography, biographers un-
derstand that they do not just find "fact." They realize that "fact" is a word
we give to material that serves particular purposes. Ira Nadel described
these purposes as
establish[ing] infonnation, verisimilitude and truthfulness. The first is the
simplest: to convey infonnation and detail; the second is the most evocative
and representational, generating a mood or atmosphere; the third is the
most difficult and perhaps the greatest test of a biographer: establishing a
sense of the character and personality of the subject.263
Hence, various things can serve as "fact." For example, a biographer may
use a date to show chronology, or a description or a quote from an author's
unpublished writing to show the subject's voice, self-characterization, belief
or style.264 Something becomes a "fact" when the biographer decides-by
including it in her or his work-to imbue it with the integrity and truth
value that society gives to things called "facts." Paul Murray Kendall per-
ceived this aspect of normative biography when he wrote:
It will not do simply to say that biography is made out offact (whatever that
taking it out of context. In conventionalizing and freezing it, no doubt I transgress the spirit of his
methodology.
For alternative typologies, see J. CLIFFORD, supra note 126, at 83-89 (dividing biography into
objective, scholarly-historical, artistic-scholarly, narrative, and fictional); L. EDEL, supra note 10; M.
LoMASK, supra note 14, at 2-3 (dividing biography into narrative, topical, "and," and essay); I.B.
NADEL, supra note 119, at 151-82 (suggesting biography based on myth, metaphor, and metonymy);
Snipes, supra note 129, at 147 n.2 (dividing biography into documentary, narrative, critical, histori-
cal, psychological, artistic, and imaginative).
262. W. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 43. Epstein argues that, by taking life that continues to exist
only through texts and transforming it into a text which communicates life (see id. at 27, 32), biogra-
phy establishes an ontological space between the natural and the narratable where the cultural 'facts'
of institutional documentation are treated as remnants of the natural events ofa concrete life." (fel. at
33).
263. I.B. NADEL, supra note 119, at II.
264. The ancients always did think of things first. Plutarch wrote, "It must be borne in mind
that my purpose is not to write histories, but lives . . .. Sometimes ... an expression or a jest
informs us better of their characteristics and inclinations, than the most famous sieges ...." Marc
Pachter, The Biographer Himself: Introduction, in TELLING LIVES, supra note 125, at 2, 12 (quoting
Plutarch's Life 01 Alexander, in PLUTARCH'S LIVES 159 (A.H. Clough trans. 1988»; see also J.
GARRATY, supra note 19, at 11-12 (stating that different biographers will reach different characteri-
zations about the same subject); M. LoMASK, supra note 14, at 29-36.
The "style" of the subject-the choice of words, the rhythm of the prose-is an integral part of
biography. See, e.g., L. EDEL, supra note 10, at 130-31; Paul Mariani, William Carlos Williams, in
THE CRAFT OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY, supra note 189, at 133, 143; James Walter, Language and
Habits 01 Thought: Biographical Notes on E.G. Whitlam, 4 BIOGRAPHY 17, 21-28 (1981).
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is) ... we demand of biography that it be true to a life . .. signifying not
"factual" but "authentic"-and authenticity lies not only in what we are
given but in what we are persuaded to accept.265
When the normative biography recognizes the life-text, it recognizes the
tentativeness of "facts." A normative biography may imply certain things
are "fact." It may use quotations as "fact" to support an interpretation, to
understand "fateful uncertainty,"266 and to reveal an unknown voice or style
of the subject. It may document sources and integrate "facts" into the biog-
raphy and the biographer's interpretation. Nevertheless, the biography
seeks not to tell the "facts" but to offer the reader an understanding of the
subject which deserves to be recognized as possibly true. And the reader, in
recognizing the life-text, remains free to reach her or his own conclusions
about the validity she or he will give to these "facts."
2. Recognizing the biographical subject.
Recognizing the biographical subject involves the awareness that the bi-
ographer, through her or his biography, constructs the subject. Epstein
writes that "neither antique fame nor distinguished character is a prerequi-
site for inclusion in the biographical catalogue of the emerging consumer
society. On the reading public's behalf biography can now authorize practi-
cally anyone (or anything) as a biographical subject."267 While this recogni-
tion permits social awareness of "cultural outlaws" and their differences, it
also forces their differences into the sameness of the biographical narra-
tive.26B The normative biography seeks to avoid and its reader is wary of
such entrapment. In addition, the normative biographer acknowledges deci-
sions about which particular aspects of the subject should be recognized.269
The biographer writes aware "that each life is part of a tissue of confidences
which extend to many lives."27o The biographer abandons the simple di-
chotomy of social and solitary self.
In its place, the normative biographer struggles with a more complex
understanding of the subject,271 In particular, family interests and the sub-
ject's "privacy" hinder the normative biographer. First, at one extreme, a
normative biography cannot bow to family interests; hence, it cannot be "au-
thorized." Such a biography would recognize only the subject that the fam-
265. P.M. KENDALL, supra note 7, at 8.
266. C.D. BOWEN, supra note 132, at 70.
267. W. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 67.
268. ld. at 88.
269. See Linda Simon, Boston Phoenix Literary Section, Nov. 1989, at 8.
270. J. CLIFFORD, supra note 126, at 123 (quoting Times Literary Supplement, Apr. 10, 1969,
at 388).
271. For example, Cynthia Ozick argues that T.S. Eliot can only be understood by "reading
backwards" from biographies about Eliot. Cynthia Ozick, A Critic at Large: T.S. Eliot at 101, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 20, 1989, at 144. Eliot implied his poetry bore no relation to his life. He claimed to
be the most perfect artist-one who separates "[t]he man who suffers and the mind which creates."
ld. at 123. He argued that examinations ofpoetry in light of the poet's life were incorrect. The Eliot
biographies, however, reveal that his life "decodes" his poems, e.g., explaining oblique references.
Despite his protestations, the man and mind were inseparable. ld. at 144.
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ily wants the world to see or that the family itself sees.272 But at the other
extreme, to ignore familial social bonds which formed and continue to form
the subject may depict a warped solitary representation.
Second, understanding the subject involves understanding why the sub-
ject desired privacy273 or why she or he rejected274 it. On one hand, norma-
tive biographers remain aware of ethical sensibilities; "even our intimacy,"
as Richard Ellman has written, "shows occasional restraints, little islands of
guardedness in a blunt ocean."275 But on the other hand, biographers ex-
plore a deeper conception of the subject. For example, Whitman's biogra-
pher wrote that "[w]hat is at stake here is not just invasion ofprivacy but the
biographer's obligation to give Whitman himself the freedom he never had
to pursue his recognition that love, of whatever sort it may be, was at the
root of roots in his life and poetry."276
When the normative biography recognizes the subject, it recognizes that
"[b]ecause of historical, social and ultimately stylistic restrictions and infer-
ences, no biography can duplicate the life of its subject."277 A normative
biography may make certain assertions about the subject. It may privilege
familial interests or it may discuss seemingly "private" incidents. But
throughout, the biography remembers that "[b]iography is essentially a de-
mythologizing form. Consistently, it functions to correct, restate or reinter-
pret false or distorted accounts of the subject ...."278 "False" indicates a
momentary judgment; the normative biography looks forward to its own de-
mise by reinterpretation.279 The reader begins the process by demytholo-
gizing the biography's portrayal of the subject and recreating a slightly
altered understanding of the subject.
3. Recognizing the biographer.
Recognizing the biographer involves abandoning the illusion of objectiv-
ity in biography and seeing the literary art in biography. Normative biogra-
phers, like some traditional biographers, know they are not objective, not
"Almighty God."280 But unlike traditional biographers, normative biogra-
phers are read by a reader aware that she or he is reading only "Henri
272. See notes 244-250 supra.
273. See, e.g., Mark Holloway, Norman Douglas, in THE CRAFf OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY,
supra note 189, at 89, 91; Deirdre Bair, Samuel Beckett, in THE CRAFf OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY,
supra note 189, at 199,214; see also Pachter, supra note 264, at 5-6; C. D. BOWEN, supra note 132, at
111.
274. See text accompanying note 240 supra (discussing Beckett).
275. R. ELLMANN, supra note 10, at 4.
276. Kaplan, supra note 47, at 54.
277. I.B. NADEL, supra note 119, at 176-77.
278. Id.
279. Cf. Carolyn Heilbrun, Was there Life After Percy?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, § 7 (Book
Review), at 14, col. 3 (praising EMILY W. SUNSTEIN, MARY SHELLEY: ROMANCE AND REALITY
(1989): "As biographers of women, we must ... ignore old reputations and, by means of our revi-
sionary work, become the belated daughters of mothers long dead and long betrayed by history.").
280. Catherine Bowen wrote, "Ofcourse the biographer is biased! All history is written from a
point of view and no one but Almighty God could write with pure objectivity." C.D. BOWEN, supra
note 132, at 92.
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Troyat's Tolstoy,"281 not "the life of Tolstoy." The reader perceives that the
subject and the biographer "smellD equally of mortality."282 Subject, biog-
rapher, and reader cannot escape the prejudices of race, class, ethnicity, gen-
der, time, place, sexual orientation, and other variables. Normative
biography discusses how the subject's perceptions have been influenced by
these social and cultural factors. This analysis will raise the hint in the biog-
rapher's and reader's mind that the biographer operates under similar
clouds. In tum, the reader suspects that she or he also may reach conclu-
sions based on questionable assumptions.
Elucidating and disguising the interpretive practice ofbiography requires
the normative biographer to practice a literary art. Biography is selection,
arrangement, interpretation, and description. The use of the subject's writ-
ings is integral to this process. If the biographer did not quote, the reader
would question the biographer's statements. If the biographer only quoted,
the essential creative interpretive practice of biography would vanish. Selec-
tive quotation, however, forces the reader to confront the interpretive nature
of biography.
When the normative biography recognizes the biographer, it recognizes
the fact that biography is interpretation by biographers. The reader serves,
in essence, as a second biographer, reinterpreting the story the actual biogra-
pher wrote. The normative biography may use quotations and it may make
assertions. But by this very practice, which seems to establish convincing
authority, the normative biography encourages the reader to criticize and
doubt the "truth" of the biographer's interpretation.
4. Recognizing the life-course.
Recognizing the life-course involves questioning the traditional vision of
the self. The life-course of the subject, as the history of biography shows,
generally has been depicted as linear: birth to death, accompanied by sym-
bolic moments of insight, in a rational outline of development.283 The nor-
mative biographer abandons the "myth ofpersonal coherence."284 She or he
realizes that a life is a story only because the biographer tells it as one;285 a
subject's self exists in unity only because the biographer describes it as such.
Instead, the normative biographer accepts "that we are self-contradicting
and ambivalent, that life is neither as consistent nor as intellectual as biogra-
281. Simon, supra note 269, at 8, col. 2; see also I.B. NADEL, supra note 119, at 189; L. EDEL,
supra note 10, at 43.
282. R. ELLMANN, supra note 124, at 261.
283. See W. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 138-39.
284. James Clifford, "Hanging Up Looking Glasses at Odd Corners"; Ethnobiographical Pros-
pects, in STUDIES IN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 177, at 41, 44. Clifford writes: "A person ••. is a
sequence of culturally patterned relationships, a forever incomplete complex ofoccasions to which a
name has been affixed, a permeable body composed and decomposed through continual relations of
participation and opposition." Id. at 53-54; see R. ELLMANN, supra note 124, at 264-65.
285. See Introduction, in LOUIS O. MINK: HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING, supra note 117, at
I, 19-20 n.17. Cynthia Ozick has argued that biography's appeal is its attempt to show that life is a
teleology. Cynthia Ozick, Where Orphans Can Still Become Heiresses, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1987, § 7
(Book Review), at 13, col. 3.
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phy would have it be ...."286 Even the judgment that some lives are "fail-
ures" and others "successes" is recognized as the product of traditional
cultural and societal assumptions and conventions of the self.287 When the
normative biographer claims a course for the subject, she or he also realizes
the transience of the claim. The reader then will realize it also, feeling free
to find partial triumph where the biographer saw only disaster. When the
normative biography recognizes the life-course, it recognizes that the life and
self displayed, in the subject's own writings and the biography itself, take
form from the particular writer. Thus, the life-course of the subject in a
normative biography may begin before birth and end after death. It may
move with authorial expectations or against them. It may trickle through
years of nothingness or plunge through seconds of glory. It may touch and
possess others or it may retreat alone.
Whatever the particular version of the life-course, the recognition of its
mutability reinforces the overarching recognition of normative biography:
no definitive answers or mandates can be found or proposed, for biography
demands questions and decisions by biographer and reader. Normative bi-
ography seeks not to solve the problems revealed in each frame. Instead, it
resolves never to forget that these tensions are the very essence ofbiography.
C. The Normative Biography and the Law
In a bounded world, one biographer noted, biography is circumscribed
by history to the north, fiction to the south, obituary to the east, and tedium
to the west.288 Copyright law's control over the fifty years following an au-
thor's death further binds biography. As demonstrated above, legal doc-
trines show little patience with traditional biography. Moreover, they do not
tolerate normative biography. Consider the four problems with which nor-
mative biography struggles. The law-in particular copyright and privacy
law-denies their existence.
First, normative biography's exploration of the "life-text" and the "biog-
rapher" revolves around an understanding that "fact" is not found. Aware
that "fact" symbolizes the interpretation which the reader attributes to the
so-called "fact" material, normative biography uses quotation as fact. By
juxtaposing quotations and the biographer's interpretation, normative biog-
raphy forces the reader to confront the inherent ambiguity of "fact." The
law's fact/expression dichotomy and its assumption of objectivity prohibit
this understanding. Intuitive judicial division of fact and expression bars
"fact" as a fluid concept. The presumption that a quotation is "expression"
bars the use of quotation as fact. The objectivity assumption bars the inter-
pretive refrain of normative biography.
286. L. EDEL, supra note 10, at 108.
287. See Phyllis Frus McCord, '~Spectre Viewed by a Specter'': Autobiography in Biography,
9 BIOGRAPHY 219, 221 (1986).
288. Daniel J. Boorstin, Welcome, in BIOGRAPHY & BOOKS 12 (J. Cole ed. 1986) (quoting
Philip Guedella).
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Second, normative biography's approach to the "subject" and the "life
course" reveals the difficulty of establishing intent to publish. Caught be-
tween family perceptions and the written remnants of the subject, normative
biography hesitates to construct a simple or clear depiction. Normative bi-
ography does not accept the face value of the subject's words. It seeks to
place them within the context of the subject's numerous human connections
and cultural influences. Moreover, it realizes that the life course does not
cease with the subject's death but encompasses the biographer's and reader's
lives-the subject only "lives" through the living reader. But the law as-
sumes that "unpublished" indicates a choice not to publish, ignoring this
complexity. It blocks normative biography's attempt to indicate the ambigu-
ity of intent through quotation and interpretation. It silences normative bi-
ography's caveat: biography is and is only interpretive-our determination
of the subject's "intent" reveals, in part, our perceptions, our "intent."
Third, normative biography's search for the "subject," the "biographer,"
and the "life-course" indicates the interwoven nature of present lives and
past history. Normative biography proposes that lives gather meaning from
their accessibility, their connectedness to other lives. The legal idea of pri-
vacy, premised on inaccessibility, refuses to credit such a notion. In a
clumsy attempt to protect the subject's life, the law condemns the subject to
perpetual death. It refuses normative biography's offer of cautious and re-
spectful resuscitation.
The law does not permit normative biography. The three legal assump-
tions-objectivity, discoverable intent, and individual identity-are the an-
tithesis ofnormative biography. Most importantly, the law fails to recognize
the essence of normative biography: a perpetual, self critical, and reinterpre-
tive investigation of our history.
IV. RECOGNIZING NORMATIVE BIOGRAPHY
But can any legal doctrine recognize and facilitate normative biography?
I sketch three conceivable solutions, hoping more to provoke the reader's
mind than to offer a definitive answer.
A. Anything Goes
As a first solution, the law could eliminate the fact/expression dichot-
omy, effectively ending the copyright monopoly. This solution would rid the
law of problematic assumptions underlying the dichotomy, assumptions un-
derlying fair use, and privacy concerns operating within copyright law. I
suspect this solution would never be adopted by legislatures or accepted by
courts.
Obliterating the fact/expression dichotomy probably would prove un-
workable. Wed to a system permitting exclusive individual ownership of
writing, our legal system would most likely replace this dichotomy with an-
other designed to balance between the desire for publicly-held "facts" and
the necessity to stimulate investment in those facts by protecting creative
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"expression." Moreover, assuming nothing appeared to replace the fact/ex-
pression dichotomy, this biographer's fantasy would, in effect, be an archi-
vist's (and future biographer's) nightmare. Regardless of the "validity" of
inward-looking conceptions of "privacy," people do have some sort of pri-
vacy concerns. Potential subjects, fearing uninhibited, malicious, and care-
less use of their darkest secrets, would protect themselves through pre-death
conflagrations. Biography, at least written biography, would become
impossible.
B. Enhanced Fair Use
As a second solution, the law could retain the fact/expression dichot-
omy, but permit enhanced fair use for users of unpublished expression and
restrict the applicability of privacy concerns in copyright actions. Motivated
by the New Era controversy, recent commentators and the congressional leg-
islation have suggested variations on this idea. I have selected four represen-
tative proposed solutions-those offered by Judge Pierre N. Leval, Judge
Roger J. Miner, and Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb, as well as the language of
H.R. 4263.
1. Judge Leva/.
Like many critics, Judge Leval289 would allow fair use for unpublished
materials if the use preserves the "utilitarian purpose" of copyright.290 But
in addition to "permitting authors to reap the rewards of their creative ef-
forts" to "stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual en-
richment of the public,"291 Judge Leval would justify fair use by a secondary
author where that use is "transformative."292 Use is "transformative" if'
"the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings ...."293
Transformative uses include "criticizing the quoted work, exposing the char-
acter of the original author, proving a fact ...."294 Judge Leval would
retain some special status for unpublished material, particularly if the mate-
rial is "created for or is on its way to publication."295 He would not, how-
ever, "read protection of privacy into copyright" law.296
At first glance, this approach appears to reach results that normative
biographers might desire-an expanded fair use privilege seemingly focused
289. Judge Leval tried Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
rev'd. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); and New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 884·F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1168 (1990).
290. Leval, supra note 19, at 1108.
291. [d. at 1107.
292. [d. at 1111.
293. [d.
294. [d.
295. [d. at 1118-22.
296. [d. at 1129.
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on a biographer's use of material. Judge Leval's assumptions, however, like
those of the current law, shackle normative biography. Judge Leval does not
embrace the transitory quality of "fact." His analysis focuses on fair use,
presuming that quotations must be expression. More importantly, although
Judge Leval hesitates to serve as literary critic,297 his analysis replaces read-
ers as critics with judges as critics. For example, he would allow the use of
quotations to prove a biographer's conclusion,298 but not to "enliven" the
text of the biography.299 The distinction reveals some recognition that in
normative biography, quotation can constitute fact. Judge Leval's "enliv-
ening" standard, however, is conclusory.3oo It amounts to the judge's deci-
sion that the quotation did not support the conclusion. Quotations which
are used to reveal the subject's unpublished voice, to show her or his writing
style, or to demonstrate ambiguity in the original material will be particu-
larly endangered by an "enlivening" test. Moreover, the "enlivening" stan-
dard suggests that if the original author is pedantic, boring, and obscure, the
biographer can appropriate more material. Judge Leval's assumption that
so-called "professional" authors as biographers' subjects differ from other
writers also appears in his focus on publication intent, and the notion runs
counter to normative biography's complex vision of intent.30 ! Under Judge
Leval's solution, the right to use unpublished expression is inversely propor-
tional to the perceived place of the writer in the literary canon. His belief
that literary subjects should receive greater and different protection from
other biographical subjects ignores normative biography's ability to "rescue"
subjects from the ignominy of historical judgment. His solution removes the
reader from the process of normative biography and substitutes the judge.
2. Judge Miner.
Judge Miner finds it particularly discomforting that "judges, rather than
literary critics, should decide whether literary material is used to enliven text
or demonstrate truth."302 He advocates, instead, expanding fair use beyond
published materials to include "publicly disseminated materials."303 Such
materials would include "any letters sent without a requirement of confiden-
297. See New Era. 695 F. Supp. at 1506 (arguing that "[i]t is an uncomfortable role for courts
[evaluating the purpose and character of the use] to serve as literary critics •..• Wejudges generally
lack both competence and the necessary information to form such opinions").
298. Leval, supra note 19, at 1113-14, 1116; see New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1508-19.
299. New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1504, 1507, 1524; see Leval, supra note 19, at 1112. Leval's
"enlivening/transformative" dichotomy appears to have grown out of his acknowledgment in New
Era that Ian Hamilton, author of the Salinger biography, had unjustly appropriated Salinger's words
to avoid writing a "pedestrian" sentence. [d. at 1113.
300. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1137, 1142-43 (1990) (suggesting that despite Leval's contrary protestation, Leval's test would
justify his holding in Salinger as well as his holding in New Era because "without precise quotations,
a reader of the Salinger biography is unable to see for himself whether the biographer's characteriza-
tion of the letters is accurate").
301. Leval, supra note 19, at 1120.
302. Miner, supra note 57, at 6 (referring to his New Era en banc denial opinions, 884 F.2d at
661).
303. Hearings, supra note 6, at 3 (statement of Judge Miner).
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tiality and any documents, including letters, that have been in existence for a
certain period of years without having been copyrighted."304 Judge Miner
would bar the use of all other "unpublished" materials.305
Judge Miner's suggestion recognizes that the "unpublished" rubric may
winnow out as chaff, documents for secondary quotation that normative bi-
ography suggests the author would have permitted biographers to use. Un-
fortunately, Judge Miner would leave little grain for biographers. His
proposal prohibits quotations from diaries, personal notations, and other
documents which, by their nature, are not sent to others. As Ralph Oman
indicates, the proposal would not permit quotation from "voluntarily undis-
seminated works whose contents are of great public interest."306 Judge
Miner's conception of intent, though broader than that adopted by legal doc-
trine, ignores normative biography's protestations of the interpretive nature
of the judgment. Were Judge Miner's proposal to become the law, even
Hallmark thank-you notes-which may reveal the subtle motivations of a
subject-would have a "requirement of confidentiality:" the blanket state-
ment "For Your Eyes Only" embossed across the top.
3. Professor Weinreb.
Professor Weinreb's proposed solution emphasizes the "fairness" aspect
of fair use.307 He states that "[w]hat is fair is ... fact-specific and resistant
to generalization."308 Rejecting the narrow utilitarian focus of Judge Leval,
Professor Weinreb seeks to expand the fair use inquiry beyond the four stat-
utory factors309 to include an examination of the ordinary or customary
practices and public expectations of biographers.310
I agree with Professor Weinreb's proposal to the extent that it favors
context-specific decisions. Normative biography highlights the uniqueness
of each biographical process. Nevertheless, the standard remains vague.311
Weinreb argues that a context-specific "fairness" test would be relatively
easy to apply because "fairness has more, and more widely accepted, mean-
ing" than context-specific standards applied in other areas of the law.312 But
Professor Weinreb's apparent substitution of the public as literary critic does
not avoid the judge-as-literary-critic problem. He has not adopted norma-
304. Id. at 4. The 1976 Act grants copyright from the moment of a work's fixation. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1988). I assume that Judge Miner intends this provision to permit the use of materials
found, for example, 125 years after creation, without the possibility that an heir could bar their use
by claiming copyright protection.
-305. Miner, supra note 57, at 9.
306. Hearings, supra note 6, at 65.
307. Weinreb, supra note 300, at 1138 ("[f]air use has historically been and ought to remain
what its name suggests: an exemption from copyright infringement for uses that are fair").
308. Id.
309. See id. at 1151-52.
310. Id. at 1159-60.
. 311. Weinreb insists that his thesis, depite being vague, is nonetheless applicable. Id. at 1153
("It is a mistake to suppose that because fairness is a very open standard and its application highly
fact specific, it is without substantial content.").
312. Id.
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tive biography's recognition that each reader, each biographer, must have
the chance to be a critic. "Ordinary practice" privileges the judge's percep-
tion. Who or what defines ordinary practice?313 Biographical theory?
Mass-market pop biography? Authorized biography? By its very definition,
normative biography challenges "widely accepted" notions of fairness in the
context of biographical writing. Thus, normative biography makes "ordi-
nary" biography an impossibility. And the dubious incorporation of "nor-
mative considerations" into ideas of accepted fairness314 offers limited
comfort to a publisher contemplating a biography.
4. Proposed Legislation.
Although recent congressional subcommittee action has been scuttled,315
the probability that the future legislative sessions may revive the proposed
bills, H.R. 4263 and S. 2370, justifies a discussion of their original and com-
promise solutions. The original language would have altered the copyright
statute to read fair use of a copyrighted work "whether published or unpub-
lished."316 While seemingly promising, the legislation would have done no
more than eliminate the possibility of a per se rule against any use of unpub-
lished material.317 The unpublished nature of the work, nevertheless, would
have remained a factor in the fair use analysis.318
Such mild legislation would have done little to ameliorate the situation
created by New Era and Salinger. As several experts testified at the hearings
on the legislation, the case law does not necessarily suggest an absolute
bar-the unpublished nature of the work merely has been used by courts as
an element in their analysis.319 The proposed language did not aid judges or
authors in determining the circumstances under which unpublished material
can be used;320 indeed, under the bills, Salinger and New Era would proba-
313. The ambiguity of "ordinary practice" and the suggestion that the determination may not
solve the difficulty appeared in a crucial early fair use case, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). In Folsom, Justice Story found no fair use for the appropriation of entire
letters. He stated, "the defendant has selected only such materials, as suited his own limited purpose
as a biographer. That is, doubtless, true; and he has produced an exceedingly valuable book. But
that is no answer to the difficulty." ld. at 348.
314. Weinreb, supra note 300, at 1153.
315. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
316. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
317. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 13 (statement of Floyd Abrams).
318. See id. at 3 (opening remarks by Rep. Kastenmeier); 136 CONGo REc. S3549 (statement of
Sen. Paul Simon) ("Nor is the bill intended to render the unpublished nature ofa work irrelevant to
fair use analysis."). Under current four factor analysis, the plaintiff always wins factor two-the
nature of the copyrighted material. When the plaintiff wins on factor two, she or he will necessarily
win factor four (effect on the market for the copyrighted material), see Hearings, supra note 6 (state-
ment of Floyd Abrams), the most important factor, according to the Supreme Court. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). Thus, eliminating a perse rule
will not necessarily change the outcome of the four factor analysis.
319. See note 318 supra.
320. Hearings, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Jonathan W. Lubell, terming the amendment
"vague"); id. at 64-66 (statement of Ralph Oman); id. at 2 (statement of Judge Miner); id. at 1
(statement of Barbara Ringer, terming the bills "broad").
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bly be decided the same way.321 The software industry lobbied against the
language for a different reason. It believed that the bills would have had a
detrimental application to often unpublished computer software. Compro-
mise language limited fair use of unpublished materials to "history, biogra-
phy, fiction, news, and general interest reporting, or social, political, or
moral commentary."322 The new words did not change the approach of the
original language; courts remained free to grant broad fair use to published
materials and curtail fair use of unpublished materials.
Regardless of the wording a future Congress may settle on, the intent of
the bills may remain the same: to clarify that fair use analysis should apply
to unpublished materials, probably only when used in literary works. But,
contrary to the congressional testimony of optimistic proponents323 and pes-
simistic opponents,324 the original language did not ensure that most unpub-
lished materials will survive the fair use analysis-and the new language
compounded the problem. If the original bills ironically might have codified
the distinction between published and unpublished material that already ex-
ists within the four factor analysis,325 the compromise version definitely did.
The language created a fair use spectrum: broad fair use for published
materials; no fair use for unpublished materials used in nonenumerated
works; and limited fair use for unpublished materials used in the enumerated
literary works. As long as future draft bills continue to support an interpre-
tation that unpublished materials receive narrow fair use considerations, the
bills change nothing for normative biography.
Each of these suggestions looks to alter the fair use doctrine to resolve
the "contest" between biographers and subjects. Granted, in some ways
each suggestion would help biographers. But when fair use is the legally
accepted doctrine by which a court considers everything from the morality
to the commercial value of appropriation, the biographer bears the burden of
justifying every use. Moreover, fair use removes from the analysis the cru-
cial role of the reader and the understanding of biography's interpretive na-
ture. Fair use simply may be the wrong aspect of copyright to alter.
C. Fact Use
A third solution, and the one I prefer, builds on a recognition of the
implicit legal assumptions underlying, and reconsiders the legal understand-
ing of, the fact/expression dichotomy. It reimagines the fact/expression di-
chotomy, not as an attempt to determine, in a final, legal sense, objective
reality, but as the recognition of interpretive biography-a method of using
321. In both cases, the court could reason that although the fair use analysis applies to pub-
lished and unpublished work, the unpublished nature of materials limits the extent of permissible
use.
322. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1990, at I, col. 2.
323. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 13 (statement of Floyd Abrams); id. at 3 (statement of
Chief Judge Oakes); id. at 3-5 (statement of Judge Leval).
324. See id. at 1-3 (statement ofJonathan Lubell); id. at 1, 6 (statement of Barbara Ringer); id.
at 1-3 (statement of Judge Miner).
325. See note 318 supra.
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written material I shall call "fact use." Under fact use, using unpublished
material as "fact" does not infringe the copyright. In short, fact use suggests
that biographers' quotations of unpublished expression should be classified
as "fact" under the fact/expression part of a copyright analysis and thus
permitted.
Although fact use has not explicitly been recognized, courts have sensed
that biographers' use of quotations as fact deserves recognition and have
struggled to find a rationale for protection. In Harper & Row,326 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court found an exception for President Ford's characteri-
zation of the White House tapes as a "smoking gun."327
In Meeropol v. Nizer, 328 which considered the Rosenberg biography, the
court wrote that quotation "may be essential to an accurate rendition of the
relevant thoughts themselves. Furthermore, the subjects' expression itself
may be a relevant part of the history relating to the case."329 In the district
court decision in New Era, Judge Leval described an unpublished quotation
by L. Ron Hubbard: "[his] utterances are ... pertinent historical facts."33o
Leval emphasized that "[t]he important facts ... are the words them-
selves."331 In his New Era concurrence, Judge Oakes distinguished between
"words that are facts calling for comment" and "that words themselves may
be facts to be proven."332 Judge Leval in his Harvard Law Review article
asked, "[I]s it not clear . . . that at times the subject's very words are the
facts?"333 Although the importance of fact use has been noticed by some
judges and commentators, it has not been recognized by any appellate court
as a valid legal doctrine.334
Fact use analysis would not necessarily be easier to perform than a fair
use analysis. Critics will no doubt question how a judge can determine
whether material is used as a "fact." I doubt any simple test can be found.
But at least fact use would be more closely tied to broader, deeper under-
standings of biography-biography the way biographers write it and the way
readers read it-and would permit a normative vision of biography with its
attendant revisionary possibility. Unlike the passive fair use test, fact use
would require the addition of creative material by the biographer because a
quotation only becomes a "fact" when a biographer incorporates it into the
326. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
327. Id. at 563.
328. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
329. Meeropol, 417 F. Supp. at 1212. Although the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment, it suggested that the manner of using the letters "quoted out of
chronological order ... without indication of elisions or other editorial modifications" had played a
large role in its decision. Meeropol, 560 F.2d at 1071.
330. New Era Publications, Int'I v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1527 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
33 I. Id. at 1524.
332. New Era, 873 F.2d 576, 592 (2d Cir. 1989).
333. Leval, supra note 19, at 1115.
334. Cf. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Circuit Judge
Walker, sitting by designation) (h6lding that biographer's quotation from the unpublished papers of
Richard Wright constituted fair use).
HeinOnline -- 43 Stan. L. Rev. 357 1990-1991
January 1991] THE LAW OF BIOGRAPHY 357
biography; however, such incorporation has a far broader meaning than, for
example, Judge Leval's transformative use.
I do not attempt here an exhaustive discussion of the precise contours of
fact use; but, I will sketch some of its aspects. Fact use precedes fair use-it
forces courts to decide what they now presume: fact or expression. But
although fact use employs the words of dichotomy, it adopts an ever-
changing categorization. Under fact use, quotations from unpublished
materials become facts when the materials "establish information, verisimili-
tude and truthfulnesS."335 "Becoming fact" involves presentation by the bi-
ographer of quotations and conclusions and the possibility of critical
reception by the reader. A biographer may use a quote in many ways: to
support a point in the biographer's thesis, to offer a version of the author's
voice, to demonstrate the author's style, to convey verisimilitude-the sense
of "being there"---or to serve some yet unimagined purpose. After a prima
facie showing that the biographer had used the quote as "fact," the burden
would shift to the plaintiff to show that the biographer did not use the mate-
rial as a fact. Fact use would apply to all materials regardless of their pub-
lished or unpublished statuS.336 Certain uses probably would not constitute
fact use: overextensive quotation to demonstrate a point, taking material out
of context, using material without purpose or without attribution, or using
the material to bare details about the subject with malicious intent. These
uses fail to suggest information and verisimilitude. They do not accord quo-
tations the respect, dignity, and integrity that our loose idea of "fact" re-
quires. I do not mean by this qualification that a biographer could not
disagree, dispute, or deny the original author's statement. A biographer
could write that the original author was wrong and misguided-and could
use expression as fact to demonstrate her or his point. But when the biogra-
pher quotes an author's words without context or understanding, intending
only to denigrate the original author's humanity, the biographer no longer
uses the words as fact. The biographer has betrayed her or his obligation to
subject, reader, and self.337 My conception of "fact use" is not simply a
335. LB. NADEL, supra note 119, at 10-11; see text accompanying note 263 supra.
336. Determinations of the legality of using what is undisputedly "expression"-for example,
large amounts of material for anthologies-would remain subject to current fair use analysis.
337. Biography reviews repeatedly praise the obligation of the biographer to balance stern,
careful criticism with human understanding. See, e.g., David Bevington, A Classic and a Brawler,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 20, col. 3 (praising DAVID RIGGS, BEN JONSON:
A LIFE (1989): it "not only fully justifies our curiousity, but handles with admirable tact what might
be lurid and sensational if our only interest were the gossip"); Deirdre Bair, Going Hoarse for Litera-
ture, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 15, col. I (praising the presentation of
Flaubert in HERBERT LoTTMAN, FLAUBERT: A BIOGRAPHY (1989), as "inviting sympathy even
while [Flaubert] provokes animosity"); Diggins, supra note 18, at 27, col. 2 (praising MARTIN
BAUML DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON: A BIOGRAPHY (1988), for "a superb biography of a great
man who started out with the right moral convictions only to reach the wrong political conclu-
sions").
Others have been chided for their failures. See, e.g., Caroline Seebohm, Taking On The Town,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, § 7 (Book Review), at 11, col. 3 (suggesting that Brendan Gill's gratui-
tous slights and "obsession with his subjects' social and financial position, the clubs they belong to,
and their sexual proclivities (a particular emphasis is placed on homosexuals), reveals all too clearly
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judicial recognition that expression is sometimes fact, as Judges Leval, New-
man, or Walker would have it.338 It is broader than that. It grants rights of
quotation to biographers who are out to understand, not simply exploit, the
subject; who seek to use subjects to question the present world as well as
describe the past one; who desire to work with the subject to bring her or
him into the contemporary world, mingling eras and questioning reigning
myths.
Fear of biography and the desire to keep things unpublished and private
often rests on a fear of how others-society-will treat us when they dis-
cover our secrets. Will they mock us, hate us, laugh at us-or will they
perceive our humanity? To judge without explanation and exploration is to
condemn the biographer and reader without trial. The current doctrine
lures biographers into playing judge without procedural safeguards-they
need not, indeed cannot, offer support for contentions based on unpublished
materials. Moreover, the law allows the reader and biographer to be swept
up by the underlying assumptions. Fact use, however, creates a gap through
which biographers and readers can discard their assumptions. Fact use en-
courages quotation by biographers of unpublished material to support con~
tentions and understandings. The act of aligning quotations and conclusion
will remind biographers of normative biography's claim that biography is,
first and foremost, interpretive. The reader confronted with the quotations
and conclusion cannot escape making her or his own criticisms, and reinter~
preting the author's interpretation. Fact use builds into biography the begin-
nings of revisionary possibilities.
So for those readers who ask, "looks intriguing, but will it run?" I very
briefly outline a possible scenario had the New Era trial court invoked fact
use. Russell Miller and his publisher, Henry Holt, Inc., would have claimed
that all the quotations were used as facts to communicate "information, veri-
similitude and truthfulness." The holder of Hubbard's copyright, New Era,
would have rejected the claim and argued, first, that the quotations were not
used as fact; and second, that those which constituted expression, infringed
the copyright. The fact use analysis would resemble Judge Leval's fair use
opinion in substance but not in structure.339 The court would consider
that the author's outsider status, even at this point in his life, remains an unhealed wound"); James
Atlas, Band ofthe Stewbums, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 18, col. 4, at 19, col.
2 (stating of BETTINA DREW, NELSON ALGREN: A LIFE ON THE WILD SIDE (1989), that "[t]ime
and again, she exonerates Algren instead of making an effort to understand his behavior"); Kathleen
Quinn, Brave New Career, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 25, col. 2 (criticizing
DAVID KING DUNAWAY, HUXLEY IN HOLLYWOOD (1989), for his "adolescent" interest with re-
spect to "gracelessly conjectur[ing]" about whether Huxley's first wife was a lesbian). But see Bar-
bara Grizzuti Harrison, Perversity Raised to a Principle, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1989, § 7 (Book
Review), at 11, col. 1 (chastising FIONA MACCARTHY, ERIC GILL: A LoVER'S QUEST FOR ART
AND GOD (1989), for her lack of "moral outrage" over Gill's incestuous relationships).
338. See notes 326-334 supra and accompanying text.
339. Several parts of Judge Leval's substantive discussion become irrelevant under fact use.
Effect on the market disappears. As Judge Leval noted in his opinion, "[t]he statute does not con-
cern itself with market effect resulting from competition to apprise the public of an area of factual
interest." New Era Publications, Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). "Substantiality"-how important a part of the first work is used, Harper & Row Publishers,
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whether Miller's passages were used to convey information, verisimilitude,
and truthfulness. If the quotations appeared to be used as "fact," the quota-
tions would be presumptively permissible. Most of the quotations appear to
have been used as fact. Hubbard's copyright holder thus would bear the
burden of proving that Holt and Miller had not used the quotes as facts
because, for example, they were taken out of context or were used mali-
ciously or without purpose. Few quotes appear to have been so used. Thus
the court would find that Holt and Miller could use the majority of quota-
tions. Only the few quotes constituting "expression" would face a fair use
analysis.
But more important than the doctrinal application offact use to New Era
is the hypothetical consequences of the decision. Fact use shifts the burden
from the biographer or publisher to prove "fair" use to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the biographer failed to use the quotations as facts. In a
sense, the plaintiff must prove lack of revisionary possibility in the biogra-
phy. Fact use encourages biography by ensuring a legal analysis that avoids
the chilling effect of New Era, listens to a biographer's reasons for using
quotes, and privileges those biographies that approach normative biogra-
phy's provocative power. Fact use, therefore, emphasizes that biography is
an organic process-it is neither only the life of the subject nor the ideas of
the biographer. It assumes that biographer and subject have rights and re-
sponsibilities. The subject should not have her or his words lifted in large
chunks by a freeriding biographer and employed only as expression; how-
ever, the subject also should allow these words to be used as facts by others
in order, to tell the history in which she or he participated. The family can
lock up; burn, and hide unpublished materials; however, it assists human
history when it permits access to documents, allows others to share its un-
derstandings of the subject, and alters its representation of the subject's con-
cerns in light of changing time. The reading public could read any
biography written and published; however, it aids human understanding
when it ensures that financial support exists for those biographies which at-
tempt to change assumptions about society, and maybe, once in a while, sits
down and read them. Judges can ignore literary theory, avoid change, prefer
simplicity and efficiency, draw lines, use proxies-do everything possible to
stamp out any form which might cast doubt upon the correctness of current
doctrine; however, they fulfill the trust with which our system imbues them
when they shape the law to promote biography, make complex contextual
decisions to the best of their ability, and search for the revisionary possibility
in the law.
Martha Minow writes, "Legal decisions engrave upon our culture the
stories we tell to and about ourselves, the meanings that constitute the tradi-
tions we invent."340 In the law of biography, legal decisions do not engrave;
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985)-would vanish. Things are no less "fact"
because they constitute the "heart" of the expression.
340. Martha Minow. The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered. 101
HARV. L. REv. 10, 95 (1987).
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rather, they tend to slice stories out of our culture. They silence our voices.
They prohibit our invention. As a society, we have a responsibility to tell,
invent, and explore, and then retell, reinvent, and reexplore. Biography de-
scribes this ability; current law circumscribes it. But in the end, when the
lawyers close their briefcases and the writers retire their pens, law and biog-
raphy are our creations. And from our right to know ourselves, we must not
shrink. back.
